

The Post-Communist Parliament of the Czech Republic: Institutional Development, Professionalization, and Democratic Learning in the First Term, 1993-1996

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One of the central challenges facing post-communist East and Central Europe is the establishment of effective democratic governance. In practice, at the national level this has required a wide array of organizational measures: founding political parties to compete in free and fair elections; creating functioning parliaments; promoting accountable chiefs of state and government; and fostering a sound legal and judicial system. The construction of democratic governance in the messy aftermath of authoritarian collapse is a daunting task. Citizen demands and expectations for change are high. Political tempers are heated and sometimes vengeful. Economic and social resources are limited. Ethnic and national tensions arise. Leaders may be idealized or demonized.

We consider institutionalization--the evolving capacity of governing bodies to process demands, develop policies, administer programs, and to adjudicate conflicts--to be crucial for the success of the democratic transitions and consolidation in the dangerous political landscape created by the fall of communism. Institutionalization requires strong innovation, organization, communication, and determination. These factors are *especially* necessary in parliaments as organizations that hold the key to rebuilding governing structures throughout the rest of the society. Systematic analysis of parliaments' structures, legislative performance, and deputies' abilities can provide important insights into the evolution of democratic governance.

Institutionalization of parliaments has become an important measuring stick of progress toward democratic governance of the former Central and Eastern European states because they required such significant internal changes. The communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe governed under a democratic veneer. Claims that representation and collective decision making were taking place in the national parliaments were patently false. The single party monopoly of power meant that such bodies were "minimal parliaments" or, put in more harsh language, "rubber stamp" organizations where legislative charades took place. The real locus of decision-making was found elsewhere, among the top organs of the communist parties. Within the former "minimal parliaments," dominated by the executive bodies of the communist parties, there had been little need and few opportunities to develop specialized committee structures and complex procedures that were necessary for an active legislative process. In the minimal parliaments the deputies needed little training or experience in legislation because their real task was to publicize and endorse policies determined elsewhere.

It is not surprising, then, that advocates of post-1989 democracy sought to establish parliaments that were more representative and effective than their predecessors. The newly refurbished parliamentary institutions were designed as arenas of competition and cooperation among major political actors --especially political parties. In parliaments these parties would give voice to the people and wage the key battles for changes in the political, social, and economic systems. New organizational patterns would afford wide opportunities for deputies to pursue new political agendas. But these new patterns would also be extremely demanding, requiring completely new conceptions of activity, decision-making, and political methods.

In this paper--a case study of deputies' opinions in the Czech parliament from 1993 to

1996--we seek to analyze the institutionalization of the parliament and the professionalization of its deputies in terms of the demands made upon them. We view the effective functioning of the parliament as a byproduct of opportunity and capability. This means that we will examine the context in which the parliament operated during its first term and assess the extent of the change toward a more structurally elaborated organization and expanded roles and activities of deputies. By comparing deputies' survey responses in 1993 at the beginning of the term and in 1996 near the end of the term, we seek to gain some insights into institutionalization, professionalization, and, more broadly, democratic learning.

Background

This paper focuses on the results of two nearly identical surveys, one conducted in February of 1993 and sponsored by the Sociological Institute of the Czech Academy of Sciences together with the Center for Electoral Studies of the University of Amsterdam (SI/CES) and a second conducted in March of 1996 and sponsored by the Sociological Institute together with East Carolina University and Charles University in Prague (SI/ECU/CU). The paper supplements these two surveys with two others, one sponsored by the University of Leiden in early 1994 (Leiden) and the second sponsored by IREX and the University of Notre Dame in late 1996 (IREX/ND). The surveys that form the basis of this paper span the most critical period of political development in the Czech Republic and one of the key periods of development for politics in the Czech lands in the twentieth century. Surveys of Czech deputies began just one month after the Czech Republic became independent and just over three years after the collapse of Czechoslovakia's communist regime in late 1989. A full understanding of the surveys findings requires a brief recapitulation of events that occurred before and during this period.

1989 through 1992

The period from late 1989 until 1993 saw the establishment of a groundwork for a democratic political life. The development progressed in stages. During 1990 the country experienced a radical reconfiguration of political institutions within the communist institutional framework and the successful conduct of free elections. The political mobilization of the early part of the year found organization and expression in the Civic Forum (OF), a loosely coordinated mass movement that won a majority of seats in the first freely elected Czech parliament. Four other parties also succeeded in gaining parliamentary representation in those elections: a severely reorganized and far smaller Communist Party (KS,,), a regionalist party representing the areas of Moravia and Silesia (HSD-SMS) and a Christian Democratic party (KDU) that campaigned in coalition with the Czech People's Party (,, SL) that had survived the communist era as a satellite party subject to the direction of the KS,, .

Between late 1990 and early 1992 a parliamentary coalition of the OF and the KDU-,, SL (along with their Slovak counterparts) undertook the challenging task of establishing the specific legal framework for a democratic political system and a market economy. At the same time, the OF underwent significant changes, splitting into three major streams and a large number of other

minor formations. With this fragmentation, however, came increased organization of the component parts and the emergence of political parties that more closely resembled their counterparts in advanced industrial democracy. The other Czech parties in parliament also experienced splits--albeit none quite as fundamental--and consequent underwent reorganization into more coherent political organizations.

The deputies elected in 1990 bore little resemblance to the common picture of a deputies either in Communist-dominated parliaments or those of advanced western democracies. In contrast to the Communist era parliaments in which a system of guaranteed representation had produced a broad distribution of deputies from all social classes, occupational groups, educational levels, ages, and genders, the method of democratic election actually produced a more demographically homogenous body with considerably fewer industrial and agricultural workers and women. In contrast to western parliaments, however, the 1990 Czech parliament contained an extremely high representation of deputies with backgrounds outside the politics and administration sphere, particularly those with experience in the educational and cultural spheres. This phenomenon proved short-lived, however. Many of these deputies had occupied positions far down the electoral lists of their parties, and their election came about through a combination of unexpectedly high support and vacancies created by those who would not or could not serve. Many of these "accidental" or "surprise" members found legislative roles fulfilling, but many found the responsibilities burdensome or disillusioning due to the full-time work, having to interact in part with members of the old communist order, and political divisiveness. Among the disgruntled, many did not seek or accept positions on their parties' electoral lists in 1992 (Olson, 1994; Mansfeldová, 1998).

The 1992 elections witnessed a "process of maturation of the political system"(Mansfeldová, 1998). Candidates hailed more from political party organizations than from movements or social groups and many had experience in sub-national levels of the governmental and political administrations. Although their political experience was limited, it exceeded that of their predecessors and included participation in politics at a wide range of levels ranging from local municipal councils to ministerial positions in the previous government. By the 1992 elections, the demographics of parliament had moved further toward the norm of western democracies with the median member of parliament being a college-educated male in his mid-to-late 40's.

The parties and coalitions elected to parliament in the June 1992 elections included the core elements of all of the parties elected in 1990: the HSD-SMS, the KDU-., SL, the Civic Democratic Party (ODS), which inherited the largest single share of support from the fragmented OF, and the much smaller Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA), which also emerged from OF. The Communist Party also gained seats as the predominant party in a coalition known as the Left Bloc (LB). The parliament also included a left-of-center coalition called the Liberal Social Union (LSU), a left-of-center Social Democratic Party (., SSD), and the nationally-oriented Republican Party (SPR-RS,,). With the exception of the ODS which held 38% of seats in the Czech parliament and the LB which held 18%, the remaining six parties all hovered between 7%

and 8%. Within this crowded and fragmented field, ODS joined with ODA and KDU-„, SL to form a bare majority coalition. This majority coalition proved unable to find a compromise with its counterpart in Slovakia and the two sides quickly agreed on the dissolution of Czechoslovakia. Under the new Czech constitution, the parliament elected in 1992 became the highest legislative body in the new Czech Republic when it became independent on 1 January 1993.

1993 through 1996

The surveys taken in the Czech parliament during February 1993 provide a snapshot of the attitudes and expectations of 68% of the Czech parliament's deputies (136 out of 200) during the second month of the independent Czech Republic and only the eighth month of their parliamentary term. For many--if not most--deputies, this was also their eighth month in any sort of elected legislative body. Fewer than 40% of the deputies in this parliament had served in the 1990 Czech parliament or as the Czech Republic's deputies in either house of the 1990 Federal parliament. Of the respondents to the survey, nearly 40% had never before served in *any* legislative body at any level.

In addition to limited parliamentary experience, the 1993 survey also begins from a basis of high fragmentation. The eight electoral subjects receiving parliamentary seats in 1992 together included twelve parties, and a wave of early defections quickly followed the opening of parliament. In a particularly confusing transformation, the parliamentary delegation of the Left Bloc coalition split into two groups, the larger of the two claiming the name the Party of the Left Bloc (SLB) and the smaller claiming the name of and legal continuity with the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (KS„ M) which had organized the original LB coalition. By early 1993 the parliament included representatives from at least thirteen distinct parties and a number of deputies who claimed no party affiliation. As Table 1 indicates, the 1993 SI/CES survey includes representatives from eleven of those parties and more than 50% of the deputies from five of the eight largest parties. The 1996 SI/ECU/CU survey provides even better coverage, with nearly 50% of deputies from the eight largest parties and rates over 80% for some of the larger delegations. The 1994 Leiden survey represents the largest sample and includes nearly 80% of deputies for all major parties. The smaller 1996 IREX/ND survey covers nearly 50% of deputies for the larger parties in parliament.

What do deputies do?

In the broad macro-political analyses of policy-making and party competition, the simple day to day patterns of deputy activity easily can be overlooked. In most cases this oversight does little harm, but it is precisely these patterns that shape the behavior of the legislative body as a whole, and the reinforcement of such patterns over time can produce a legislative "corporate culture" that shapes the behavior of the institution.

What are deputies' most important tasks?

The 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys ask deputies to estimate the allocation of their work time in hours into thirteen categories. Table 2 shows the responses to this question after being consolidated into the four categories of legislative work (preparation for and participation in legislative sessions and committees), party work (activity in the party parliamentary group and in the local and national branches of the party), external contacts (time spent with representatives of the government, bureaucracy, and other parties) and constituency work (correspondence and contact with voters). Legislative work occupied the largest single bloc of time in both periods¹-- accounting for 43% of the total in 1993 and rising slightly to 45% in 1996--suggesting the emergence of a "working parliament" as early as 1993 and its further deepening over time. Party activity also occupied significant amounts of deputies' time, though not as much as legislative work and party activity declined measurably between 1993 and 1996. It is notable that within that category time spent on party activity at the national level accounted for most of the drop in party activity, though the relative amount spent on party work at the local and parliamentary level also dropped to a small degree. Both constituency work and external contacts occupied considerably smaller amounts of deputies' time than legislative or party work, but both of these increased slightly, apparently filling time previously occupied by party activity. Time allocation within individual parties varied to some degree from the overall averages, but these variances are extremely small and there is virtually no difference among parties in the rank order of these activities in terms of their relative time consumption.

What are parliament's most important tasks?

Reinforcing these reports of time allocation question are deputies' evaluations of the importance of their tasks. These questions involve four categories of activity: legislative and budget tasks, checks on government activity, checks on presidential activity; and accommodating the demands of citizens and social groups. The results of the surveys appear in Table 3. When asked to assess the importance of these activities on a nine point scale, deputies from all parties in both 1993 and 1996 gave the highest set of marks to legislative and budget tasks. They gave the second highest set of marks to controlling the government. As might be expected in this category, opposition deputies attached more importance to the controlling the government than did members of the governing coalition, though the scores suggest that their concern receded slightly between 1993 and 1996. Cooperating with citizens and social groups occupied a position of only intermediate importance for the deputies of most parties, and declined across all parties from 1993 to 1996. The least important activity of the four investigated proved to be control of

¹The 1993 and 1996 questions differ slightly to the extent that the 1993 survey asks deputies to report time spent per week on particular activities while the 1996 asks them for the percentage of time they spend on those same activities. Table 2 equalizes the two by calculating the percentage of time occupied by each particular activity for individual deputies. (Although the 1996 question asks deputies to calculate the percentages themselves, the responses of a significant number of deputies totaled well over 100%. For three deputies the total percentages claimed for all activities summed to over 200%.

presidential activities. Already the lowest ranked category for all parties except LB in 1993, this category's importance dropped dramatically from an average level of 5.8 on the 9 point scale to an extremely low 2.8. The reason for this drop can be found clearly in the nature of presidential-parliamentary relations. Whereas Václav Havel had played an extremely active role in policy-making as the first president of Czechoslovakia (Jiřínský, 1998) and may have provoked a degree of wariness among deputies (particularly deputies of the Communist Party), he played a far less prominent political role in the presidency of the newly independent Czech Republic and was frequently overshadowed by the republic's assertive prime minister, Václav Klaus. A nearly identical question asked in the IREX/ND survey confirms the durability of this shift and in fact replicates the results of the 1996 SI/ECU/CU survey with high precision.

Does parliament accomplish those tasks?

Deputies' satisfaction with the performance of these four tasks correlated directly with their performance in 1993 ($r = .71$) but by 1996 the strength of the relationship had weakened considerably ($r = .28$) because of shifts in the level of satisfaction with particular tasks. As Table 4 indicates, coalition parties expressed greater satisfaction with the performance of these tasks than did opposition parties. The above-average satisfaction of coalition parties in 1993 only grew stronger over time as the coalition partners improved their own cooperation and faced a considerably weaker and more fragmented opposition. A reverse process occurred among the parliamentary opposition. These changes appear reflected in their considerably greater satisfaction with the legislative and budgetary process and also in the increased dissatisfaction of both the KS, M and the SLB (though not the „SSD, which in light of its increased public support may have felt itself in a stronger bargaining position). On 1996 questions about a variety of specific legislative issues and satisfaction with then-existing legislation followed the same pattern extremely closely, corresponding almost perfectly with parties' proximity to the decision-making process. ODS deputies expressed higher satisfaction than other parties in fifteen of the seventeen categories. Deputies from its coalition partners, ODA and KDU-„SL expressed somewhat lower satisfaction, though these levels were above the overall mean in all but two cases for ODA² and all but six cases for KDU-„SL.³ With only a few minor exceptions, all opposition parties expressed lower than average satisfaction, and KS, M deputies expressed the most dissatisfaction of any major party. An almost identical--though even more marked--pattern emerges in the attitudes of coalition and opposition parties with regard to control over the government between 1993 and 1996. The overall decrease in satisfaction with parliament's control over the government follows on sharp decreases in the capacity of a divided parliamentary opposition to achieve little real control over the government, a circumstance that the coalition parties responded to with increased satisfaction. Satisfaction with parliament's

²In keeping with the libertarian focus of ODA these two cases involved laws on non-profit organizations and political institutions

³In keeping with the KDU-„SL's stronger social-market emphasis, these included including laws on health care, housing, family issues, and crime.

interaction with citizens and social groups and its control of the president followed the same pattern of increased coalition satisfaction and increased opposition dissatisfaction.

What are deputies future aspirations?

One aspect of the professionalization of deputies is their future career aspirations. We were interested in tapping their ambition to continue to be involved in the political and public service arena---especially given anecdotal evidence suggesting some discontent with the burdens of office. Since most of the deputies were novices in 1993, their desires for incumbency or seeking other political positions could affect the stability and effectiveness of future governance. Table 5 presents the degree of interest in various hypothetical careers if they ceased being deputies. Reflecting the changing economic context, entering the entrepreneurial (private) sector was the most favored choice in both 1993 and 1996--with the most interest being displayed by members of the „MUS and the „SSD and the least by members of the LB/KS„, M/SLB and KDU-„, SL (both years) and of the ODA (1996). Mansfeldová suggests these responses can be attributed to the fact that "many deputies had not abandoned their entrepreneurial activities while serving in parliament and they intended to continue these business activities more intensively after the conclusion of their parliamentary service" (Mansfeldová, 1998). The IREX/ND survey shows a similar fondness for entrepreneurial activities, though its overall position dropped to second behind activity as a deputy in a lower-level representative body.

Serving as a representative at a lower level--in effect, as a member of a city council--ranked second in both surveys, slightly declining overall from 1993 to 1996. Since such positions involve only part-time work, it is likely that deputies viewed service in a city council as a less burdensome means for staying in politics without really becoming career politicians or abandoning their entrepreneurial pursuits. Interest in council positions varied to some extent with particular parties, with the highest interest expressed by members of those parties with the strongest regional and local organizations, particularly the KDU-„, SL and the KS„, M and its successor parties. As Mansfeldová posits, the strong organization of these parties and their extensive experience in regional politics may make service at a lower level more attractive (Mansfeldová, 1998).

The least favored careers were those that carry the heaviest political and administrative responsibilities---government minister, state administrator, and mayor. These had a rather low degree of attractiveness in either year with little variation from party to party. We interpret this to mean that although most deputies accepted the burdens of their occupation, they did not actively seek out additional tasks or more taxing employment, even if this might bring with it an increase in prestige and public visibility.

Whatever the deputies might consider as alternative career choices, it is clear that their primary career choice remained parliament itself. Almost three-quarters of those who were deputies at the end of the 1992-1996 term actually decided to compete for reelection, and only one-fifth declared they would forego another term of service in the future. Moreover, the

establishment of the Czech Senate in 1995 provided another career choice in the 1996 survey and this was the third most frequently selected option (Mansfeldová, 1998). A career in the senate appealed particularly strongly to deputies of the larger and more established parties--ODS, KDU-„ SL and „ SSD--that could plausibly compete for seats in the single-member senate districts.

Who decides?

There are manifold questions about decision-making that need to be decided in any new democracy. Basic rules are laid down in the constitution, but equally important are the rules of the game decided on by those that play the game. This includes:

- Who decides overall policy: government, parliament, the coalition, one party?
- Who decides party action in parliament: the parliamentary delegation or party leaders?
- Who decides on the deputy's vote: the party, the delegation, or the individual deputy?
- On what basis does the deputy vote if there is a conflict: conscience, party voters, constituents?

The questions asked in the 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys as well as those of the 1994 Leiden survey and the 1996 IREX/ND survey provide important answers.

Who shapes government policy?

In the evolving institutional relationships between President, Prime Minister, the Government, deputies, and political parties, it is revealing to examine patterns of influence. Table 6 details deputies' answers to the question "Who should determine government policy" and shows that responses followed coalition-opposition lines but with some important exceptions. Given a choice between "the governing coalition," "parliament," and "the strongest party," deputies in the coalition parties overwhelmingly favored their own "governing coalition" while non-coalition parties showed less enthusiasm. Deputies of the coalition-leading ODS--at the time the single largest party--were more likely to name "the strongest party" but those who did so represented only a relatively small percentage of the party's deputies, suggesting some degree of loyalty to--or at least acceptance of the need for--the broader coalition. With the exception of an LB deputy who perhaps felt loyalty to the principles of the one party state, not one deputy outside of ODS endorsed the "strongest party principle" in either survey. Among the opposition parties a surprisingly large number proved willing to accept the "governing coalition" as opposed to "parliament" as the main determinant of government policy. Deputies of LB expressed a marked preference for "parliament" in 1993 but this moderated slightly and both of its offspring parties, showed a higher acceptance for "governing coalition," though this did not reach the level of a majority. The acceptance was even greater among deputies of „ SSD though their support cooled somewhat over time and their support for "parliament" increased. The IREX/ND survey conducted at the beginning of the following parliamentary term shows these preferences to be extremely stable.

„ SSD's acquiescence is difficult to explain with confidence. It may represent political maturity in accepting the prerogative of a rival majority, but it may also represent acceptance of

political reality. Table 7 shows that although few deputies outside of ODS felt that the strongest party *should* set government policy, more than half of all such deputies felt that the strongest party--in this case ODS--actually *did* set government policy. This included not only the majority of deputies of „ SSD but also a substantial share from LB/KS„ M/SLB and even from ODS's coalition partners ODA and KDU-„ SL. The coalition partners apparently held few illusions that they shared fully in the government's decision-making process and by 1996, in fact, nearly all ODA deputies and three fifths of KDU-„ SL deputies cited "the strongest party" as the determinant of government policy. Only members of ODS disagreed with this assessment in significant numbers, and the sharply contrasting perceptions produced considerable strains within the coalition government parties' relations, particularly during the complicated and intense post-1996 election negotiations during which KDU-„ SL and ODA attempted to reformulate the coalition in such a way as to prevent ODS from receiving a majority of ministerial seats and to ensure more parity of decision-making (Krause, 1998a; Mansfeldová, 1998).

Another potential source for determining policy is the recourse to the population through referendums. To include referendums within questions about policy making in the Czech Republic in 1993 and 1996 would have posed problems, however, because the Czech constitution made no formal provision for such a referendum. A separate set of questions therefore asked deputies about whether they would approve of establishing mechanisms for both consultative and binding referendums. The results in Table 8 show two distinct patterns that conform closely to predictable patterns. In the first place, it is clear that opposition parties tended to support the idea of a referendum much more strongly than did coalition deputies. Coalition deputies voiced almost unanimous opposition to the idea of binding referendums and nearly as strong opposition to consultative referendums in both 1993 and 1996. In contrast, nearly half of all opposition deputies supported binding referendums and nearly all supported consultative referendums, especially in 1993. Given the governing coalition's majority during this period, the results reflect the coalition's unwillingness to open up the political process to mechanisms that did not fall under its direct control. It is equally interesting that although opposition deputies eagerly supported the notion of a consultative referendum that could potentially be used to pressure the coalition into making concessions, they were not as enthusiastic in support of a binding referendums that would tie their own hands just as surely as they would tie those of the coalition. With referendums as with other mechanisms, deputies showed an acute awareness of and preference for those options that would maximize the political power of their own party.

Who shapes the party line?

The previous section suggests that most deputies believed government policy was actually determined by the largest party in parliament and that most of the remainder attributed government policy to the majority coalition in parliament. In either case, determination of policy essentially follows party lines and relates directly to the party positions taken by those parties in the majority. The determination of party policy forms a second crucial level in the decision-making process. Surveys of deputies' opinions provide insights into how parties establish their policies.

It is perhaps not surprising that surveys of deputies' opinion reveal a preference that decisions on party policy be made by party deputies in their parliamentary party group (PPG) rather than by any other source. The 1993 survey of Czech deputies asked them "should there arise a difference between the opinion of your PPG and the leadership of the party, who should rightfully have the last word?" and gave them the option of choosing the PPG, the party leadership or declaring that "it depends on the situation." As Table 9 shows, deputies who received this array of choices tended to opt for the safe response--"it depends" but of the 38% who did not, more than two thirds opted for the PPG over the party leadership. This applied across the party spectrum. Only in ODS did the PPG and the party leadership receive similar levels of approval, and even in that case it was the PPG that received a small plurality. The elimination of the "it depends" answer from the 1996 questionnaire produced a strikingly different set of results. The percentage of deputies choosing the party leadership increased only slightly over 1993 levels whereas the percentage choosing the PPG increased by three to four times.⁴ The relative choices among parties also changed to some degree. Whereas ODS deputies had been more likely than those of other parties to choose the party leadership in 1993, they responded exactly at the mean in 1996. Instead it was the deputies of „ SSD, KS,, M and KDU-,, SL who were more likely than average to choose the party leadership. The differences, however, were extremely narrow and with the exception of ODA--whose deputies unanimously opted for the PPG--all of the parties occupied a very narrow range.

Yet while deputies may have overwhelmingly preferred a dominant voice in party policy, they felt increasingly that their decisions were influenced from without. Asked whether the party leadership influences club decisions, 41% of deputies responded affirmatively in 1993. As Table 10 indicates, the share had risen to 55% by 1996. ODS deputies were the most likely to acknowledge influence from the party leadership with rates of 63% in 1993 and 73% in 1996. Such rates rose even more sharply in other parties: „ SSD increased by 14 percentage points, KDU-,, SL by 17 percentage points and KS,, M by 37 percentage points.

It appears that this increase began as early as 1993 because the 1994 Leiden survey of deputies in the Czech parliament found that "79% [of deputies] stated that the 'party's national executive, as opposed to the parliamentary party, has the most say in party policy" and that among the largest parties in parliament the rate was even higher (Kopecky, forthcoming). A 1996 IREX/ND survey of Czech deputies finds similar results. Questions in that survey asked deputies to rank the importance of party experts, the PPG, the party executive committee, and the party leader on policy questions and on internal party matters. On policy matters, deputies from the three parties--KS,, M, „ SSD, and KDU-,, SL--ranked the party's executive committee as first in importance by a significant margin over any rival. Of these, KS,, M and „ SSD ranked the PPG as next in importance while KDU-,, SL deputies ranked the party leader next in importance.

⁴It is not possible to determine whether this change is more reflective of a change in the question or a change in deputies' opinions. The relative stability of almost every other question in the survey suggests that the bulk of the difference can be explained by the elimination of the "it depends" option.

Of the larger parties in parliament only ODS differed significantly from this pattern, ranking its party leader first in importance followed by both the party's executive committee and the PPG.. For internal party questions, the role of the PPG is even less significant. Deputies from all of the major parties responded by attributing the highest influence to the party executive committee, followed at considerable distance by the party leader and party functionaries. The PPG and party experts share the positions of least influence on such questions.

Who shapes PPG decisions?

Work by Kopecky (1996) establishes that even though the memberships of many PPGs and party executive committees overlapped significantly, the PPGs usually did exist as a distinct institutional units with the capacity to make decisions independent of the leadership and other party institutions. Establishing mechanisms for making decisions within the PPG itself posed yet another challenge in the institutionalization of parliament. Table 11 reports the results of a question that asked deputies about who exerted the most influence in PPG decisions: the PPG's leadership, its experts, its president, or functionaries of the party. Although this relatively limited range of options resulted in a high number of "other" responses, it does nevertheless provide certain clues about PPG decision-making and how it changed over time. Although certain sources tend to hold more influence among all parties, the overall pattern is not sharply defined or stable over time. With the exception of „ SSD deputies from all parties in 1993 were more likely to attribute influence to the PPG leadership than to any other source. In 1996 the leaderships of the PPGs again received more votes than any other category but significantly fewer than they had in 1993.⁵ The remaining votes for influence shifted in two directions. A significant share shifted from the PPG leadership to the sole voice of the PPG chairman, especially in KDU-„ SL and in the SLB. At the same time, an even larger share of the votes shifted during this period to the plural voices of the PPG's experts. This change occurred across the party spectrum with no exceptions. The overall influence attributed to party functionaries outside the PPG showed no significant difference over time, but individual parties did change: the party functionaries appear to have gained a certain amount of influence within the PPGs of ODS and KDU-„ SL while losing a significant amount of their influence within „ SSD. The overall picture of PPG decision-making by 1996 is one of fractured and uncertain influence with no single dominant element.

The 1994 Leiden survey confirms this impression and offers a potential resolution by increasing the range of potential answers. Its survey question about "the main point of decision-making in the parliamentary club" offers deputies a different set of options than the questions

⁵Responses from the 1996 E/U/A survey indicate that the PPGs of the government coalition parties ODS, KDU-„ SL and ODA met with their respective party leaderships (excluding ministers) on a slightly more frequent basis than did members of opposition parties.

discussed above: the PPG meeting, the PPG leadership, experts in the PPG, "somewhere else" and "it depends." Faced with this range of options, more than three quarters of all deputies pointed to the PPG meetings as the key point. ODS, „ SSD, LB and a number of smaller parties did so in even greater percentages. Only ODA and KDU-„, SL deputies identified important influences among PPG experts, and KDU-„, SL deputies also pointed to the undefined "somewhere else" category. And even in these cases the PPG meeting retained a clear plurality. A closer look at the answers in the "other" category from the 1993 and 1996 survey reinforce the notion that power in PPGs lay in the delegation as a whole rather than any particular segment of it. The most common "other" answer focused, with varying choice of words, on the "majority within the PPG" or the "PPG vote."

Who shapes deputies' decisions?

Although the party leadership appears to play an important, even dominant role in determining party policy, and although a variety of forces contribute to the internal decisions made by PPGs, the ultimate decision about how to vote still rests with individual deputies. Article 23. of the Czech constitution states that "MPs and Senators will perform their mandates personally in accordance with their promise and they will not be subordinated to any orders." This article effectively forbids any contractual relationships surrounding the exercise of a mandate, but it gives no other guidance except to explain that a deputies must "perform the mandate in the interest of all the people and to the best of [their] knowledge." Although the constitution declares that deputies are free to vote as they wish, they may nevertheless decide voluntarily to tie their decisions to a particular set of ideas, institutions or voters. To which ones they can and should bind themselves is the subject of extensive political theory and numerous models of representation. A series of questions from several surveys--all, inevitably, using different wordings--offer insight into the question of just how deputies in the Czech Republic interpret the meaning of their deputy mandate.

Questions on the 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys offer deputies three options: the party line, their own conscience, and the desires of the voters. As Table 12 indicates, the 1993 SI/CES survey shows near equality between the options of party line and personal conscience, with voters opinions falling a far distant third. Within most of the larger parties, deputies exhibited a marginal preference for party line. Only within „ SSD were the two equal (at 47% of respondents) and only within LB did conscience fall far short. Correspondingly, only in LB did voters opinion receive a markedly higher than average set of preferences. By 1996 deputies' responses had changed significantly. While the level of support for voters' desires remained low, the balance between party line and conscience tilted dramatically in favor of conscience, which rose to account for 70% of all deputy responses. A nearly proportional shift occurred in every major party. ODA deputies opted almost unanimously in favor of conscience, and KDU-„, SL deputies approached a similar level. ODS and „ SSD deputies remained slightly below the mean in their support for conscience voting, but their support for this position nevertheless increased markedly from its 1993 levels. LB/KS„, M/SLB deputies also increased their support for this option, but at the same time they also increased their support for voters

opinions.⁶

The IREX/ND survey of the parliament elected in 1996 confirms this shift and helps to clarify the underlying structure of deputy opinions by asking them to rank the options of conscience, party line and voter opinion in order of importance. The overall pattern in which deputies ranked the most influential option corresponds directly to the rankings obtained in the above mentioned 1996 survey. The personal opinion option gained the largest number of first place votes followed at some distance by party line and subsequently by voters opinion. This sequence also corresponds perfectly to the rank order cited by almost 40% of deputies, nearly twice as many as cited the next most popular choices. Breaking the overall results down into pairs of options reveals likewise that deputies tended to rank their own opinion above both party line and voters' opinions and opted for the party line over voters' opinions. This pattern did not hold for every party, however. ODS and KDU-„, SL fit the broader pattern extremely closely. Deputies from „ SSD differ widely from one another in their rankings of the influences but they tend in general terms to reverse the top two entries in the broader pattern, ranking party line slightly above personal opinion. Deputies of KS„ M , by contrast, place party last in their rankings and place voters opinions above their own opinions as the most important influence. This characterization of „ SSD as the most party-focused and KS„ M as the most voter focused and ODS and KDU-„, SL most focused on the deputy opinions corresponds perfectly to the findings of the 1996 survey mentioned above.

A second, related set of questions asks deputies not strictly about the basis for their decision but rather about the broader sense of whom they represent. The 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys ask this question directly and offer three possible answers: "members of your party," "voters of your party" and "all voters in your electoral district." As Table (12) shows, a narrow majority of the deputies in 1993 opted for "party voters" but the actual level of support for this position varied greatly from party to party. Nearly four-fifths of deputies from the Left Bloc (LB) and three-fifths of those from the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) saw themselves as representing "party voters" whereas less than one-quarter of the deputies from the coalition KDU-„, SL and opposition „ SSD and „ MUS felt the same way. These parties, by contrast, opted by a wide margin to consider themselves as representatives of the voters in their electoral districts. In a reflection on the relative unimportance of party membership in the Czech Republic (as in most new democracies in central and eastern Europe) only a negligible number of deputies saw any role for themselves as a representative of party members. In the 1996 survey, the overall opinions on representation remained almost identical to their levels in 1993 but the stability of

⁶Kopecky's 1994 survey adds little to the discussion because he does not include voter opinion and does include a catch-all "it depends" category that attracted nearly 40% of deputy responses. His survey does offer hints that the shift to conscience voting began as early as 1994 because of the remaining 60% of respondents who did choose an option, only one-sixth opted to vote with their parliamentary club against their own opinion.

overall level conceals a notable degree of homogenization among parties on this issue. A majority of deputies from ODS and KS, M and LB continued to view themselves as representatives of party voters, but the size of the majority was smaller than it had been in 1993. Correspondingly, the majority of deputies from KDU-, SL and , SSD viewed themselves as representatives of voters in their electoral districts but here again this majority declined between 1993 and 1996. The results suggest that deputies increasingly viewed their role as a complex mixture of strict representation and trustee roles with neither position predominating in any major party.

Other surveys help to flesh out the deputies' understanding of representation. The 1994 Leiden survey asks deputies how important it is for them to represent various groups. In addition to social and professional groups and party members and activists, the Leiden survey also asks about party voters and voters in the electoral district, breaking these down into four specific categories: party voters in their electoral district, party voters nationwide, all voters in their district, all voters nationwide ("the nation as a whole"), as well as social and professional groups and party members and activists. In line with the aforementioned 1993 survey, responses suggest that deputies think about representation largely along party lines. Deputies attributed the greatest importance to representing party voters in their own electoral district and party voters in the country as a whole. Representing all voters in the nation as a whole occupied the third highest level of importance and representing all voters in the electoral district placed a distant fifth. Between these two stand the representation of party members and activists. At the bottom of the list appears the representation of specific social and professional groups. The same overall pattern holds within certain parties. The representation of party voters at the district and national level occupy first and second place for every major party except ODA, which places representation of the whole nation above the party-specific circumstances.

The questionnaire used by the 1996 IREX/ND survey gives deputies a slightly different but equally broad spectrum of choices including citizens in the electoral district, all citizens, and all voters of a deputy's party as well as members of a particular nationality, social group or socio-economic class. Of these additional categories only one--"all citizens"--gained the support of a significant number of deputies. In fact the "all citizens" category received thirty six percent of responses, more than any other category. Party averages on this category ranged from lows of 11% from KDU-, SL and 22% from KS, M to highs of 45% from ODS.⁷ Of the remaining categories, deputies split their responses almost evenly between their parties' voters and the inhabitants of their electoral district." In reversals of previous surveys, KDU-, SL deputies appeared most likely to feel themselves as representatives of party voters while KS, M deputies opted to understand themselves as deputies of electoral districts. ODS and , SSD stood nearer the center in positions that conformed to the previous surveys.

⁷Although there is no time-series available for this particular phrasing of the question, these results from late 1996 conform to Mansfeldová's observation of "a shift toward a more general understanding of the parliamentary mandate as a representation of all citizens"(Mansfeldová, 1998).

These response patterns from the 1996 IREX/ND survey differ significantly from the 1993 SI/CES and 1994 Leiden surveys discussed above and even to some degree from the 1996 SI/ECU/CU survey. Part of the difference may be attributed to differences in options and in the wording of those options. Part may also represent what Mansfeldová describes as "a shift from strict representation of the political party and its members toward representation of all citizens" that occurred between the beginning and the end of the parliamentary term (Mansfeldová, 134). One result that can be discussed with confidence is that deputies did not exclude any particular model of representation. All but one of the representation options on the Leiden questionnaire received an average score above the median point on the scale. When allowed to name up to three groups that they represented in the IREX/ND survey, most deputies listed a series of different--and extreme circumstances potentially contradictory--options. Almost 40% of deputies accepted cited themselves as representatives of both their party, and their district. Another 35% combined the district or the party role with representation of "all citizens." Only 24% limited themselves to just one of the three possibilities. While deputies of different parties distributed their responses in different ways, a majority of deputies from all of them shared some sense of the complexity of representation.⁸

One final consideration regarding representation is the degree to which deputies opinions about representation relate to their opinions about how they should cast their votes. Comparison of deputies responses on both questions reveal a change in time and the emergence of increasingly distinct relationships between representation and voting. According to the 1993 SI/CES survey, those deputies who believed it most important to represent party members were actually less likely than others to vote according to the party line. Those who believed it most important to represent party voters were not any more likely to vote according to party line and only slightly more likely than others to decide according to voter opinion. And those who felt it most important to represent their electoral district were less likely to decide according to voter opinion and slightly more likely than others to follow the party line. These apparent inconsistencies diminished by 1996. In that year, those who felt it most important to represent party members were significantly more likely than others to vote with the party line. Those who felt it important to represent party voters were slightly more likely than others to follow both

⁸One party--KS., M--exhibited a slightly broader sense of representation than other parties. Like other parties, KS., M deputies opted for the broader categories bounded by electoral boundaries or voting behavior when asked about who they most represented, but in the broader question that allowed multiple response, their profile differed from those of other parties. In line with the party's traditional focus, deputies from this party were far more likely than average to acknowledge representation of a particular social group and a particular socio-economic class. KDU-., SL also followed this pattern, although to a considerably lesser degree. Deputies of the Christian democratic KDU-., SL were somewhat more likely than average to acknowledge that they represented a particular "social or professional group." Traces of similar results can also be found in the 1994 Kopecky survey.

party line and voter opinion and less likely to follow their own opinion. The 1996 IREX/ND survey using its slightly different phrasing on representation reveals an extremely similar pattern: representatives of party voters supported party line voting while representatives of an electoral district or all voters supported voting on the basis of voter or personal opinion. Although the differences are too small for a definitive answer, it appears that those who view themselves as representatives of an electoral district are those most likely to favor voting according to their own opinion. From an early period of some confusion, deputies thus moved toward more coherent positions that linked their voting and their representation. Yet the patterns found here are better indicators of a process that is underway than they are of overall consistency. The overall correlation between the two ideas, while increasing, remains small.

Do deputies share their voters' opinions?

To the extent that deputies represent their parties' voters, it is important to know how much deputies really know about those voters and how much they really agree with them. This is a difficult task but the questions used in the 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys make such calculations possible on the broad left-right axis that captures most of the salient political issues in the Czech Republic (Krause, 1998b). Both of these surveys ask deputies to rate themselves on a one to seven left-right scale and ask them to do the same for their party's voters.

As Table 13 indicates, the results of these surveys show a high degree of internal coherence and consistency over time. Deputies from the Civic Democratic Alliance (ODA) and the Civic Democratic Party (ODS) placed themselves clearly on the right of the spectrum in both 1993 and 1996. Deputies of the Christian Democratic Union (KDU-„, SL) placed themselves nearer to the center of their coalition partners in 1993 and moved even more to the center in 1996.⁹ Deputies from the Czech Social Democratic Party („, SSD) located themselves in the to the left of center with little change from 1993 to 1996. Deputies of the Communist Party (KS„, M), placed themselves even further to the left in both years. As might be expected, the deputies of the SLB, the more moderate of LB's splinters, placed themselves on the left directly between „, SSD and KS„, M. While the positions of individual parties did shift somewhat during the period in question, the rank order of the parties remains identical and their relative positions in 1993 correlate at an extremely high level ($r=.98$).

The connection between deputies and their beliefs about their voters is also extremely close. As might be expected, deputies tend to place themselves in close proximity vicinity to where they believe that their voters were located. With only one exception, the difference did not

⁹The deputies from the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy (HSD-SMS), the small regionalist opposition party likewise took a position near the center, though after a series of splits and reorganizations they had moved slightly to the left by 1996.

exceed sixteen percentage points of the full left-right scale in either year.¹⁰ It is noteworthy that the change in deputy positions over time shows some relation to their perceptions of voters' positions, suggesting an ability and willingness to accommodate public opinion. Deputies from parties on the right--particularly ODS and KDU-., SL--tended to perceive themselves as to the right of their voters in 1993. In 1996, the leaders of these parties still perceived themselves as standing to the right of their voters, but both cases the mean deputy position had shifted measurably to the left to approach the position where deputies had perceived party voters to be in 1993.. On the left the phenomenon is less clear. Deputies from the LB had perceived almost exact alignment between themselves and their voters in 1993 and so the slight move to the left by KS., M may have quite a bit to do with their separation from the center-leaning deputies who formed splinter SLB. Perceiving themselves slightly to the right of their voters, SLB deputies moved still further to the right, though only by a small margin and only in close parallel to perceptions of a slight rightward shift in their voting base. Overall, the difference between deputies position and their perceptions of their voters dropped from twelve percentage points in 1993 to only ten percentage points in 1996.¹¹

The accuracy of deputies' perceptions about their voters is a separate issue and can be tested through the use of public opinion survey data collected by Central European University at regular intervals between 1992 and 1996. Table 13 shows the mean positions of each party's supporters on an identical left-right scale in early 1993 and again in early 1996. For the most part, these actual figures conform quite closely to the deputies' estimation of them. In no case does the difference exceed twenty two percentage points on the full left-right scale and in nearly every case the difference is considerably smaller. It is also significant that the difference shows a marked drop from an average of fifteen percentage points in 1993 to an average of just over nine percentage points in 1996, suggesting a major improvement in deputies' abilities to gauge the mood of their own voters.¹²

Methods for shaping outcomes

A small number of the survey items focused primarily on methods used to get things done.

¹⁰With the exception of the Communist Party (KS., M), party deputies placed themselves, in varying degrees, to the right of where they estimated their voters to be in both 1993 and 1996.

¹¹The one party in which deputies did not place themselves very near their voters is the Movement for Self-Governing Democracy (HSD-SMS), a regionalist party for which positions on left-right issues might be less important than positions on unrelated issues of national and regional identity that are not easily measured on the left-right axis (Krause 1998b).

¹²With the exception of the KDU-., SL and the ODA, deputies of all parties tend to place their voters to the left of their actual position. In practice, this means that deputies of ODS and „ SSD maintained positions that were closer to those of their voters than they suspected, while KS., M deputies were incorrect in supposing their voters to be as leftward-leaning as they were themselves.

They posed questions tapping how deputies can influence the government and how citizens can influence deputies. This is distinct from questions of who does or who should make decisions.

How to influence government?

Table 14 shows that as early as 1993 half of all deputies claimed to have offered interpellative questions, and by 1996 this had risen to over two-thirds. As might be expected, opposition deputies engaged in this activity considerably more frequently than coalition parties, and every deputy in „ SSD and KS,, M claimed to have done so by 1996. Even coalition deputies acknowledged their participation in interpellations, though the rate was far higher among deputies of the more centrist KDU-,, SL than among the deputies of ODS or ODA. The act of interpellation appeared to remain largely decentralized and individual though centralization and control increased slightly over time. When asked in 1993 whether they checked their interpellations with the PPG chair, its leadership or its whole membership, deputies tended to choose a response between "sometimes" and "never." When they did check their questions, they were more likely to do so with the whole club than with its leadership, reinforcing the above argument that PPGs themselves lacked a meaningful focal point other than the club meetings. In 1996 the same pattern of response emerged but with markedly greater frequency.

When asked to evaluate the effectiveness of methods for influencing government activity, deputies of all parties in both 1993 and 1996 tended to rank their options in the same order: 1) offering draft amendments; 2) submitting their own draft laws; 3) framing questions (not formal interpellations); 4) making oral interpellations; and 5) submitting written interpellations. These results appear in Table 15. The ranking is significant because it suggests that while interpellations are a frequent activity of deputies, they are not a particularly effective method for influencing government policy. Deputies across the political spectrum appear to place more confidence in non-interpellative questions, perhaps because these are not bound by the same sets of formal restrictions. Furthermore, deputies tend to consider questions of all forms to be less effective than direct legislative action. Here it is important to note that although the act of submitting legislation may allow for drama and high impact, it is the smaller and more manageable act of legislative amendments that deputies find to be the most useful. Small steps in this case appear to function better than big ones.

Meetings between PPGs and ministers can also provide occasions for mutual information and influence. According to deputies' responses, the frequency of such meetings varied greatly from party to party. As might be expected, the coalition parties ODS and KDU-,, SL met most frequently with ministers, with meetings occurring on a weekly or almost weekly basis. Deputies from LB, by contrast, reported meetings on an almost monthly basis, and deputies of „ SSD reported even more infrequent meetings. The pattern changed little by 1996. The coalition parties continued to receive frequent visits from ministers, while the frequency of ministerial meetings with opposition deputies remained only a fraction of that level. Within the opposition, the frequency of meetings with KS,, M appears to have dropped slightly, at least in relation to the more centrist and increasingly powerful „ SSD. The frequency of meetings between ministers

and the SLB followed the pattern of „SSD rather than of KS,, M suggesting that ministers tended to reward conciliation and relative size of parliamentary delegation.

How to influence parliament and parliamentary deputies

The 1993 SI/CES and 1996 SI/ECU/CU surveys asked deputies to choose the most effective means of influencing parliament from a list that included a variety of types of public statements (petitions, letters, committee involvement, statements to the media), party contact (meetings with the party parliamentary group and with party leaders), personal contact (meetings and phone calls with deputies) and protest (mass demonstrations and strikes). As Table 16 shows, deputies narrowly chose methods of party contact over personal contact or public statements, with protest falling significantly behind. Among particular methods, deputies tended to agree on the effectiveness of personal meetings with deputies, meetings with the party parliamentary group and appearances before legislative committees, suggesting the effectiveness of direct approaches whether with individual deputies, parties or parliamentary bodies. Nor did their opinions on these methods change measurably between 1993 and 1996.

Although deputies felt the party contact and direct approaches to be most effective, this did not conform to their experience of what methods constituents actually used. Table 17 shows that in 1993 deputies reported the most experience with precisely those methods that they believed to be least effective. More of them reported experience with mass protests such as demonstrations and strikes than with other techniques. Personal contacts followed, but within this category they reported experience mainly with ineffective methods such as petitions and letters. By 1996 the situation had changed quite dramatically. Deputies reported increased experience with all methods of influence, but experiences in the protest category increased far more slowly than did experiences in other categories. Party contact remained third in rank order among the categories but only narrowly behind personal contact and public statements. Furthermore, the more direct approaches such as personal meetings with deputies, parties and committees increased most rapidly indicating a degree of learning not only among deputies but also among individuals and organized groups who, largely through trial and error, figured out which methods worked best.

Difficulties in this learning process might be attributed in part to deputies themselves, since the methods of influencing parliamentarians that they found most effective were not always those that they most preferred to participate in. The results of this question appear in Table 18. Party contacts did appear near the top of the list of the most preferred methods, but deputies showed even more preference for a wide variety of impersonal statements. Nor did these preferences change over time. The significant differences between what deputies reported as effective and what they reported as acceptable suggests their acute awareness of the mixed blessings of direct contact with constituents. While such contact might provide an important source of information for deputies' decision-making, it could also become exceedingly difficult and time-consuming. In such cases deputies might prefer a simple if unpersuasive letter.

Conclusions

The Czech parliament is a work in progress. We must exercise caution in interpreting its development when our data are limited to two early points in time--1993 and 1996. The analysis of a changing institution in a transitional political system is inherently a complex task. There are also methodological vagaries that stem from the "pilot" status of the surveys, probable guardedness on the part of some deputies in answering politically sensitive items, and differences in the substance and form of the questions as we tried to generate more precise and interesting responses. Data from a nearly identical survey conducted during the second term of the parliament, in 1998, will present additional opportunities for us as researchers of institutionalization, professionalization, and democratic learning. Yet, despite adopting a humble position, this study suggests some interesting trends.

Examination of the activities of the deputies suggests that professionalization did proceed from 1990 to 1996. The priority that deputies placed on legislative work as their most important task over party activity (with a marked decline in the latter from 1993 to 1996), combined with the secondary emphasis on constituency work and external contacts, implies that deputies began to identify themselves more as professional legislators and less as politicians. Conforming to this interpretation is the strongly shared value that the parliament's most important tasks are found in the area of legislation and budgeting. The opposition also took its role in controlling the government quite seriously and demonstrated an increasingly high sensitivity to what it perceived as the arrogance and aloofness of the coalition government led by the ODS's Václav Klaus. In fact, the deputies' self-perceptions of their own roles and those of the parliament suggest a well-informed and necessary appreciation of broader political trends in the Czech system. Yet the evaluation of parliament's accomplishment of tasks evidenced a logical distinction between the coalition deputies who became more satisfied with the institution's work from 1993 to 1996 and the opposition deputies who became more dissatisfied and frustrated. There appears to have been a sharpening of understandings of the divergent issue positions and power differentials between deputies of the coalition and opposition parties. Finally, despite the attractiveness of future careers in the private sector or desires to become representatives at lower levels in order to reduce their work loads, most of the deputies displayed a strong sense of civic consciousness by competing for reelection or by considering Senate careers. These same tendencies also reinforce the conclusion that the Czech parliament made progress in terms of its institutionalization. It developed improved capacities, established roles, regularized procedures, and norms that influence deputy behavior.

Our evidence on "who decides" also suggests a high degree of democratic learning. Most of the deputies accepted the necessity that the government coalition should dominate in the policy arena given the representative profile of the parliament of the first term and even most of the deputies of the coalition-leading ODS would not declare (in public, at least) that the strongest party should dominate government policy. Yet deputies were acutely conscious of the difference between the "ought" and the "is" of parliamentary politics. Both the opposition parties and the two junior parties of the coalition demonstrated irritation with the primacy of ODS.

Accordingly, the opposition deputies were strongest in support of both consultative referendums. When we turn to decision making within the parliament, we find most deputies favored the PPGs over the party leadership as architects of the party line. Yet deputies also displayed a growing realism of the power of the party leaderships and their efforts to expand their overall party influence from 1993 to 1996. Within the PPGs, most parties faced an ongoing struggle for influence among their presidents, PPG leadership, experts, and the external party resulting in the strengthening of the delegations as a whole. This suggests that deputies are gaining confidence in their individual capacities to deal with difficult legislative and policy issues.

In the end, deputies have had to develop their own decisional calculus. Our examination of the variety of representational models they have employed tends to confirm the notion that they are becoming more secure and assertive in their independent views and, as a result, are increasingly following their consciences. While there is still a certain attractiveness and security in voting the strict party line, by 1996 most deputies preferred to act upon their own judgments. In deriving these stands, the party has remained an important consideration--especially the deputies' sense of what party voters in their constituencies and the nation as a whole desired. As we pointed out above, however, the deputies have learned to appreciate the complexities of representation and, while not immune to logical inconsistencies, they have moved to a more coherent and integrated linkage of representation and voting. To some degree, this is a byproduct of the coherence and consistency of their self-identifications on the ideological spectrum and the rather high degree of congruity between these views and where they believe their voters are ideologically located.

During the course of the first term, deputies gained in their skills in influencing government and their appreciation of what citizens can do to influence legislators and parliamentary decisions. They have come to see the efficacy of direct legislative action, particularly offering draft amendments to improve proposed laws. Moreover, the coalition party deputies have benefitted from their frequent meetings with ministers of the government--a privilege that is bestowed less often on the opposition. In the same vein, deputies seem sophisticated in understanding the array of methods that citizens utilize to influence legislators and in judging the most direct approaches (personal meetings with deputies, parties, and committees) as having the greatest lasting impact. Yet there are inconsistencies here, for most deputies often felt more comfortable with impersonal contact than with more direct approaches. As we saw earlier, the burdens of office have weighed heavily on the first few sets of deputies. Overall, the diversity, frequency, and variety of deputy activities over the term supports the conclusion that institutionalization is proceeding positively if unevenly.

To conclude, there is complex and perplexing evidence concerning institutionalization and professionalization in the first term of the Czech parliament. We are certain that the deputies have experienced an intensive democratic learning process that is enhancing their capabilities to participate in governance. Moreover, as a result, the internal structures of the parliament and the legislative behaviors of deputies have changed in many important respects. The question of whether these patterns of institutionalization will result in greater effectiveness and stability of the political system, however, remains open and subject to further examination. Comparison of

the findings in this paper with the results of the 1998 follow-up--and subsequent planned surveys--will play an important role in understanding the development of parliaments in new democracies.

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Table 1. Distribution of seats by party and sample size by party for four major surveys of the Czech parliament between 1993 and 1996.

Event, time period	Measurement	ODS-KDS		ODA	KDU- CSL	CSSD	LSU	SPR- RSC	HSD- SMS I	HSD- SMS II	LSNS	SLB		Other/ none	Total
		ODS	KDS									KSCM	SLB		
Election, June 1992	Distribution of seats	76		14	15	16	16	14	14	-	-	35		-	200
SI/CES Survey, February 1993	Distribution of seats	66	10	14	15	16	14	11	10	4	5	35		-	200
	Number of respondents	52	7	1	8	16	1	4	8	1	2	35		1	136
	% of deputies surveyed	79%	70%	7%	53%	100%	7%	36%	80%	25%	40%	100%		n/a*	68%
Leiden Survey, early 1994	Distribution of seats	66	10	16	15	18	13	8	9	5	5	35		-	200
	Number of respondents	52	8	11	12	14	9	8	-	-	4	35		-	168
	% of deputies surveyed	79%	80%	69%	80%	78%	69%	100%	-	-	80%	100%		-	84%
SI/ECU/CU Survey, Marcy 1996	Distribution of seats	66	6	16	24	24	-	5	15	-	6	10	23	5	200
	Number of respondents	42	2	11	20	19	-	1	7	-	3	11	20	9	145
	% of deputies surveyed	64%	33%	69%	83%	79%	-	20%	47%	-	50%	100%*	87%	n/a*	73%
Elections, June 1996	Distribution of seats	68	-	13	18	61	-	18	-	-	-	22	-	-	200
IREX/ND Survey, November 1996	Distribution of seats	68	-	13	18	61	-	18	-	-	-	22	-	-	200
	Number of respondents	31	-	2	9	21	-	5	-	-	-	9	-	-	77
	% of deputies surveyed	46%	-	15%	50%	34%	-	28%	-	-	-	41%	-	-	39%

*Because the table records self-reported party affiliation, the number of respondents in a category may exceed the number listed in official statistics.

Table 2. Time spent by deputies on particular tasks as a percentage of total time spent.

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB	KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)			
(N)	52	42	-	1	11	-	8	19	-	16	19	-	35	11	-	20	-	136	145	-
Party activity	.31	.22	-.09	-	.27	-	.25	.24	-.01	.31	.25	-.06	.30	.26	-.04	.24	-.06	.31	.23	-.08
Legislative work	.44	.46	.02	-	.42	-	.47	.42	-.05	.38	.42	.04	.47	.44	-.03	.49	.02	.43	.45	.02
Constituency work	.12	.16	.04	-	.12	-	.16	.16	.00	.18	.15	-.03	.14	.18	.04	.16	.02	.14	.16	.02
External contact	.10	.13	.03	-	.14	-	.10	.12	.02	.11	.15	.04	.06	.11	.05	.07	.01	.10	.12	.02

Source: SI/CES Survey, 1993 and SI/ECU/CU Survey, 1996

Notes: Since the tables that follow will use the same format it is important to discuss certain aspects of this table. The table shows the mean scores for parties of significant size as well as overall mean scores for all deputies surveyed. The table excludes parties that did not include at least ten deputies in at least one survey. The responses of the single respondent from ODA in 1993 are not used. Results for the LB/KSCM coalition reflect split in the party's parliamentary delegation between 1993 and 1996. Shaded columns show net change between the 1993 and 1996 surveys. Change for the KSCM and LB splinters of the original LB coalition are measured against the 1993 LB baseline. Excepted where otherwise specified, all data are products of the 1993 SI/CES Survey and the 1996 SI/ECU/CU Survey.

Table 3. Importance of parliamentary tasks by category (1 = extremely unimportant, 9 = extremely important)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB						Overall			
													LB	KSCM			SLB					
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1996)	1993	1996)		
Legislative and budget	8.7	8.4	-3	-	8.8	-	8.6	8.3	-3	8.8	8.7	-1	8.6	7.5	-1.1	8.5	-1	8.6	8.3	-3		
Citizens and social groups	5.6	4.7	-9	-	5.8	-	6.3	5.5	-8	6.4	6.0	-4	6.5	6.0	-5	5.7	-8	6.0	5.4	-6		
Controlling government	8.0	6.7	-1.3	-	7.5	-	8.0	6.7	-1.3	8.4	8.5	.1	8.8	7.5	-1.3	8.5	-3	8.3	7.5	-8		
Controlling the president	4.7	2.1	-2.6	-	2.0	-	5.1	3.1	-2.0	5.4	3.4	-2.0	7.0	2.6	-4.4	3.6	-3.4	5.5	2.8	-2.7		

Table 4. How well parliament fulfilled tasks by category (1 = extremely well, 9 = extremely badly)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB						Overall			
													LB	KSCM			SLB					
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1996)	1993	1996)		
Legislative and budget	3.4	2.4	-1.0	-	3.4	-	3.9	2.8	-1.1	4.3	4.9	.6	5.7	5.9	.2	4.7	-1.0	4.5	3.7	-8		
Citizens and social groups	4.1	3.7	-4	-	3.8	-	5.2	5.0	-.2	5.4	5.9	.5	6.7	7.5	.8	6.2	-5	5.4	5.1	-3		
Controlling government	3.9	3.3	-6	-	6.1	-	4.4	4.1	-.3	6.8	7.5	.7	7.6	7.8	.2	7.7	.1	5.6	5.5	-1		
Controlling the president	5.6	3.7	-1.9	-	2.0	-	5.9	4.9	-1.0	5.6	4.7	-.9	7.7	6.7	-1.0	6.0	-1.7	6.3	4.8	-1.5		

Table 5. Deputies' interest in future careers (1 = strong aspiration, 4 = no interest)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB						Overall			
													LB	KSCM			SLB					
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1996)	1993	1996)		
Mayor	3.1	3.3	.2	-	3.0	-	2.5	2.7	.2	3.3	3.3	.0	3.2	3.5	.3	3.6	.4	3.1	3.2	.1		
Deputy at lower level	2.5	2.9	.4	-	2.6	-	1.8	2.3	.5	2.4	2.7	.3	2.2	2.6	.4	2.1	-1	2.4	2.5	.1		
Minister	3.1	3.3	.2	-	3.5	-	3.0	3.3	.3	3.1	3.0	-.1	3.3	3.8	.5	3.6	.3	3.2	3.3	.1		
State apparatus	3.1	2.7	-.4	-	3.5	-	2.9	2.7	-.2	3.0	2.8	-.2	3.4	3.5	.1	3.1	-.3	3.1	3.0	-.1		
International organizations	2.6	2.6	.0	-	3.5	-	3.3	3.0	-.3	3.0	2.6	-.4	2.8	3.4	.6	3.4	.6	2.8	3.0	.2		
Senator	-	2.3	-	-	2.9	-	-	2.2	-	-	2.4	-	-	3.3	-	3.3	-	-	2.6	-		
Entrepreneurial sphere	2.4	2.3	-.1	-	3.0	-	2.6	2.4	-.2	2.1	2.2	.1	2.4	2.9	.5	2.6	.2	2.4	2.4	.0		

Table 6. Who should determine government policy? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Parliament	.06	.02	-.04	-	.27	-	.13	.20	.07	.31	.37	.06	.76	.45	-.31	.50	-.26	.30	.28	-.02	
Government coalition	.79	.86	-.07	-	.73	-	.75	.80	.05	.63	.53	-.10	.21	.36	.15	.45	.24	.58	.65	.07	
Strongest Party	.13	.10	-.03	-	.00	-	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.03	.00	-.03	.00	-.03	.08	.03	-.05	
Other	.02	.02	.00	-	.00	-	.13	.00	-.13	.06	.11	.05	.00	.18	.18	.05	.05	.04	.04	.00	
		.06			.00			.13			.30			.57			.13				
		.86			1.00			.87			.65			.38			.80				
		0.08			0						0.02			0			0.08				
											0.04			0.05							

Table 7. Who actually determines government policy? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Parliament	.02	.00	-.02	-	.00	-	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.01	.00	-.01
Government coalition	.82	.83	.01	-	.09	-	.50	.40	-.10	.19	.37	.18	.63	.45	-.18	.30	-.33	.59	.49	-.10	
Strongest Party	.14	.17	.03	-	.91	-	.38	.60	.22	.81	.58	-.23	.38	.36	-.02	.70	.32	.38	.48	.10	
Other	.02	.00	-.02	-	.00	-	.13	.00	-.13	.00	.05	.05	.00	.18	.18	.00	.00	.03	.03	.00	
		9.00						13.00			6.00			5.00			4.00				
		29.00			1.00			47.00			61.00			62.00			74.00				
								13			17			14			4				
		50						20			15			19			4				

Table 8. Support for the introduction of referendums (1 = yes, 2 = no)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Binding referendums	1.98	2.00	.02	-	1.91	-	1.88	1.95	.07	1.88	1.56	-.32	1.55	1.36	-.19	1.80	.25	1.78	1.76	-.02	
Consultative referendums	1.86	1.90	.04	-	1.60	-	1.50	1.68	.18	1.25	1.19	-.06	1.06	1.33	.27	1.45	.39	1.47	1.59	.12	

Table 9. Who actually does determine government policy? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB	
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996
Parliamentary club	.16	.81	-	-	1.00	-	.38	.79	-	.31	.76	-	.30	.78	-	.84	-	.26	.81	-
Party leaders	.14	.19	-	-	.00	-	.00	.21	-	.06	.24	-	.12	.22	-	.16	-	.12	.19	-
Depends on situation	.71	-	-	-	-	-	.63	-	-	.63	-	-	.58	-	-	-	-	.62	-	-

Note: The 1996 survey did not offer the option of "depends on the situation."

Table 10. Does party leadership influence PPG decisions? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB	
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996
Yes	.63	.73	.10	-	.30	-	.38	.55	.17	.33	.47	.14	.03	.40	.37	.68	.65	.41	.55	.14
No	.37	.28	-.09	-	.70	-	.63	.45	-.18	.67	.53	-.14	.97	.60	-.37	.32	-.65	.59	.45	-.14

Table 11. Who has most say in PPG decisions? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB		LB	KSCM		SLB	
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996
PPG leadership	.57	.33	-.24	-	.50	-	.50	.26	-.24	.19	.35	.16	.76	.36	-.40	.55	-.21	.54	.37	-.17
Experts in the PPG	.12	.26	.14	-	.20	-	.13	.26	.13	.00	.24	.24	.09	.18	.09	.30	.21	.11	.22	.11
PPG chairman	.00	.03	.03	-	.30	-	.13	.21	.08	.06	.06	.00	.00	.18	.18	.05	.05	.05	.11	.06
Party functionaries	.14	.26	.12	-	.00	-	.00	.11	.11	.25	.00	-.25	.00	.00	.00	.00	.00	.11	.10	-.01
Other	.18	.13	-.05	-	.00	-	.25	.16	-.09	.50	.35	-.15	.15	.27	.12	.10	-.05	.18	.20	.02
PPG leadership		.31			.17			.50			.62			.43				.54		
Experts in the PPG		.11			.33			.21			.17			.19				.04		
PPG chairman		.14			.17						.06			.10						
Party functionaries		.23			.00			.21			.06			.05				.21		
Other		.11			.17			.07			.09			.24				.21		

Table 12. How should deputies vote when the disagree with their party's position? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
With voters' opinion	.00	.03	.03	-	.09	-	.00	.05	.05	.07	.00	-.07	.15	.36	.21	.16	.01	.08	.09	.01	
With the party line	.54	.33	-.21	-	.00	-	.57	.10	-.47	.47	.39	-.08	.58	.18	-.40	.11	-.47	.49	.20	-.29	
With personal conscience	.46	.64	.18	-	.91	-	.43	.85	.42	.47	.61	.14	.27	.45	.18	.74	.47	.44	.70	.26	
Party Line		.05			.17			.27			.35			.29		.08					
Own opinion		.14			.50			.40						.24		.21					

Table 13. As a deputy, whom do you represent? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Party members	.06	.05	-.01	-	.00	-	.00	.05	.05	.00	.06	.06	.03	.00	-.03	.00	-.03	.05	.03	-.02	
Party voters	.60	.57	-.03	-	.20	-	.25	.45	.20	.25	.41	.16	.78	.73	-.05	.55	-.23	.51	.50	-.01	
Your electoral district	.35	.38	.03	-	.80	-	.75	.50	-.25	.75	.53	-.22	.19	.27	.08	.45	.26	.44	.47	.03	
Party members		6.00						20.00			4.00										
Party voters		53.00			67.00			40.00			46.00			57.00		36.00					
Your Electoral district		27.00						27.00			30.00			19.00		21.00					
All citizens		15.00			33.00			13.00			20.00			24.00		41.00					

Table 14. Left-right positions of deputies and voters? (1 = extreme left, 7 = extreme right)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB	KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)			
1) Deputy's position	6.2	6.1	-.1	-	6.4	-	5.9	5.1	-.8	3.2	3.3	.1	1.8	1.7	-.1	2.8	1.0	4.6	4.7	.1
2) Deputies' estimation of party voters' position	5.3	5.3	.0	-	5.4	-	5.5	4.6	-.9	2.9	3.0	.1	1.8	1.8	.0	2.8	1.0	4.0	4.2	.2
3) Actual voter opinions	5.3	5.3	.0	-	5.4	-	5.5	4.6	-.9	2.9	3.0	.1	1.8	1.8	.0	*	-	4.0	4.2	.2
Deputy position v. Deputy estimation of voter position (row 1 - row 2)	.9	.8	-.1	-	1.0	-	.4	.6	.2	.3	.3	.0	.0	-.1	-.1	.0	.0	.6	.5	-.1
Deputy estimation of voter position v. actual voter position (row 2 - row 3)	-.3	-.4	-.1	-	.3	-	.9	-.3	-1.2	-.4	-.6	-.2	-.4	-.2	.2	*	-	-.4	-.2	.2
Deputy position actual voter position (row 1 - row 3)	.6	.4	-.2	-	1.4	-	1.3	.2	-1.1	-.2	-.4	-.2	-.4	-.3	.1	*	-	.2	.3	.1

Source: 1993 and 1996 Central European University Surveys of public opinion

* Surveys of voters after 1994 yield too few LB supporters for a meaningful assessment

Table 15. Have you interpellated? (percentage choosing available response)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB	KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)			
Yes	.21	.40	.19	-	.18	-	.50	.70	.20	.81	1.00	.19	.88	1.00	.12	.95	.07	.53	.70	.17
No	.79	.60	-.19	-	.82	-	.50	.30	-.20	.19	.00	-.19	.12	.00	-.12	.05	-.07	.47	.30	-.17

Table 16. Effectiveness of methods for influencing government (1 = very effective, 4 = not effective at all)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall		
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB	KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)			
Written interpellation	3.1	3.0	-.1	-	3.2	-	3.0	3.3	.3	2.9	3.1	.2	3.0	3.0	.0	3.3	.3	3.0	3.1	.1
Oral interpellation	3.2	3.0	-.2	-	3.1	-	2.8	3.1	.3	2.7	3.1	.4	3.0	3.0	.0	3.3	.3	3.0	3.1	.1
Non-interpellative questions	2.8	2.6	-.2	-	2.5	-	2.8	2.5	-.3	2.8	2.8	.0	2.9	3.2	.3	2.8	-.1	2.9	2.7	-.2
Submitting draft law	1.7	2.0	.3	-	1.4	-	1.9	1.8	-.1	2.2	2.2	.0	2.3	2.0	-.3	2.4	.1	2.1	2.0	-.1
Submitting draft amendment	1.6	1.5	-.1	-	1.5	-	1.8	1.6	-.2	2.3	2.0	-.3	2.2	2.2	.0	2.2	.0	2.0	1.8	-.2

Table 17. What are the most effective methods for influencing parliament? (percentage of deputies mentioning category)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Public statements	.27	.35	.08	-	.36	-	.28	.38	.10	.25	.28	.03	.34	.35	.01	.40	.06	.29	.34	.05	
Party contact	.47	.35	-.12	-	.45	-	.75	.40	-.35	.47	.39	-.08	.27	.50	.23	.38	.11	.41	.38	-.03	
Personal contact	.33	.39	.06	-	.32	-	.13	.28	.15	.38	.18	-.20	.23	.30	.07	.25	.02	.30	.31	.01	
Protest	.04	.01	-.03	-	.00	-	.00	.05	.05	.06	.34	.28	.23	.30	.07	.08	-.15	.13	.13	.00	

Table 18. With which methods have you had personal experience? (percentage of deputies mentioning category)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Public statements	.20	.76	.56	-	.91	-	.22	.58	.36	.27	.80	.53	.24	.59	.35	.60	.36	.24	.71	.47	
Party contact	.04	.56	.52	-	.77	-	.00	.45	.45	.13	.74	.61	.08	.36	.28	.58	.50	.06	.60	.54	
Personal contact	.24	.80	.56	-	.86	-	.31	.75	.44	.31	.87	.56	.41	.52	.11	.63	.22	.31	.77	.46	
Protest	.59	.50	-.09	-	.50	-	.63	.21	-.42	.34	.66	.32	.21	.50	.29	.25	.04	.42	.45	.03	

Table 19. Deputies' willingness to accept methods for influencing parliament (1 = very willing, 5 = completely unwilling)

	ODS			ODA			KDU-CSL			CSSD			LB/KSCM/SLB					Overall			
	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	1993	1996)	LB		KSCM		SLB		1993	1996)
													1993	1996)	1996)				
Public statements	1.3	1.4	.1	-	1.5	-	1.4	1.4	.0	1.3	1.2	-.1	1.4	1.4	.0	1.6	.2	1.4	1.4	.0	
Party contact	1.6	1.6	.0	-	1.4	-	1.8	1.5	-.3	1.8	1.4	-.4	1.7	1.9	.2	1.6	-.1	1.7	1.6	-.1	
Personal contact	2.7	3.0	.3	-	2.7	-	2.6	2.9	.3	2.1	1.7	-.4	2.0	2.0	.0	2.2	.2	2.3	2.4	.1	
Protest	2.9	2.9	.0	-	2.8	-	2.9	2.6	-.3	2.1	1.9	-.2	2.3	2.0	-.3	2.6	.3	2.5	2.5	.0	