

The Structuring of Political Cleavages in Post-Communist Societies: the Case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia

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Although sharing institutions for over seventy years, and transition pathways from communism, the two successor states of the former Czechoslovakia have faced distinct challenges in state-building and divergent economic fortunes. The aim of this paper is to investigate the extent to which these differing social economic problems have influenced the ideological bases of party politics and mass electoral behaviour in the two societies. Using data from national samples of the population of each country conducted in the spring of 1994, our analysis points to the existence of distinct issue cleavages dominating party competition in the two states: in the Czech Republic, partisanship relates mainly to issues of distribution and attitudes towards the West; in Slovakia, by contrast, these issues are only secondarily important in shaping voters' choice of party, while the main focus concerns the ethnic rights of Hungarians. The distinctive nature of the issue bases to politics in the two countries suggests one reason for the greater degree of political conflict evident in Slovak politics since the split and, more generally, provides evidence of the role of social conditions in shaping new political systems.

Identifying and explaining the structure of ideological conflict in democracies has long been a central task of political science theory and empirical investigation. In their classic work on the social bases of politics, Lipset and Rokkan posited various stages of cleavage formation, moving from pre-industrial cleavages resulting primarily from the process of nation-building and church versus state conflicts in which issues of centre-periphery differences, nationality and religion constitute the main ideological bases of party formation, through to the conflicts associated with the industrial revolution involving social class and trade unions as the sources of new party formation.¹ More recently, other ideological cleavages have been proposed focusing on divisions of interests derived from public versus private employment, housing tenure and financial dependency on the state,² and

¹ S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, 'Cleavage Structures, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: an Introduction', in S. M. Lipset and S. Rokkan, eds, *Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-national Perspectives* (New York, Free, 1967).

² See P. Dunleavy and C. Husbands, *British Democracy at the Crossroads* (London, Allen and Unwin, 1985)

on the emergence of a post-industrial cleavage produced by educational expansion, the shift to a service economy and new 'post-material' values.³

With the emergence of new democracies in Eastern Europe, these theoretical and empirical issues have been renewed. One issue relates to the nature of cleavages in these new democracies: in which ways are political divisions among both electorates and élites structured – by the cleavages characteristic of advanced industrial societies in the West or by others specific to the pre-communist or communist historical inheritance of these countries? A second concerns the implications of patterns of cleavage formation for the continuity of the new political systems – which configurations of cleavages are liable to result in enduring political stability?

Perspectives on the formation of cleavages and their relationship to élite competition are numerous, spanning the gamut of sociological and institutional orientations current in political science. One set of arguments has stressed institutional arrangements and mode of transition. Thus, on the one hand, the political shape of the new democracies may reflect the form of the *transition* from communism to post-communism – a factor which many authors have also cited as a key to the success and character of democratic consolidation;⁴ while, on the other, the role of *contemporary* institutional arrangements – such as electoral rules, the legislature, degree of presidentialism etc. – are deemed consequential for the structuring of cleavages.⁵

From a political sociological perspective we can also discern at least two models of cleavage formation specific to post-communist societies against which we counterpose our own position. In the first place, a number of commentators have suggested that the legacy of communism on mass attitudes is likely to inhibit the emergence of *any* stable bases for ideological alignment, because of the combined effects of communism on individuals' identities and the destruction of institutions or organizations which are capable of quickly educating public opinion. We have characterized this position the 'missing middle' approach.⁶ Others, arguing against this view, have predicted specific forms of ideological bases in post-communist societies: Herbert Kitschelt, for example, has hypothesized that political competition is likely to take place along a single axis comprised of associated pro-market and pro-liberal versus pro-state and authoritarian positions.⁷ Alternatively, strong claims have been made about the

³ See R. Inglehart, *The Silent Revolution: Changing Values and Political Styles among Western Publics* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1977); R. Inglehart, *Culture Shift* (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990).

⁴ See T. L. Karl, 'Dilemmas of Democratization in Latin America', in D. Rustow and K. Erickson, eds, *Comparative Political Dynamics* (New York, HarperCollins, 1991), pp. 163–91. For a discussion of the transitions literature in the context of post-communist societies see R. Karklins, 'Explaining regime change in the Soviet Union', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 46 (1994), 29–46; D. McSweeney and C. Tempest, 'The political science of democratic transition in eastern Europe', *Political Studies*, 41 (1993), 408–19; S. Meiklejohn Terry, 'Thinking about post-communist transitions: how different are they?', *Slavic Review*, 52 (1993), 333–8.

⁵ See A. Lijphart, ed., *Parliamentary versus Presidential Government* (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1992) *passim*; G. Sartori, *Comparative Constitutional Engineering* (London, Macmillan, 1994); M. S. Shugart and J. M. Carey, *Presidents and Assemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1992).

⁶ For an extended discussion of these views see G. Evans and S. Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe', *British Journal of Political Science*, 23 (1993), 521–48.

⁷ H. Kitschelt, 'The formation of party systems in East Central Europe', *Politics and Society*, 20 (1992), 7–50. In some more recent work, Kitschelt has argued that the extent of cleavage-based

centrality of ethnic divisions and mobilized nationalism as a basis of partisanship across the region as a whole.⁸

In an earlier paper we have rejected these accounts and have sought to provide a more encompassing theoretical account of the likely bases of party competition in Eastern Europe.⁹ First, we expected a programmatic structure to party competition to be present in most countries in the region; empirical work conducted since then has provided some support for this view.¹⁰ Second, we anticipated that the salience of economic ideology would be cut across and sometimes diminished by other issues. The relationship between economic and social liberalism, for example, was not expected to be uni-dimensional but would depend on the prevalence of important intermediate institutions like the Catholic church. Moreover, the structuring influence of economic ideology would also be affected by challenges from ethnic heterogeneity and nation-building in new states. Where the titular nationality confronted large minorities, especially where these were associated with neighbouring states with a political interest in their status, ethnic and national questions were predicted to be of great importance. Nevertheless, contrary to claims about the 'ethnicification' of politics across the region, the character and strength of the ethnic dimension to political competition would not be uniform, but was expected to be intensified in countries which had only recently become independent and where the contours of citizenship were still in the process of definition.

The second issue which is central to research on cleavage structures in post-communist societies relates to the implications of the pattern of political cleavage for democratic stability. In this respect, once again, ethnic issues may be especially important. Ethnic divisions, in particular, are thought to be conducive to instability, except where they are cross-cut by other politically salient identities and a network of overlapping group memberships is created. These cross-cutting patterns can generate a series of divided loyalties that reduce the internal cohesiveness of any one group and encourage greater social and political stability.¹¹ In the absence of such cross pressures, however, cumulative, reinforcing allegiances create systems where all the politically relevant sources of division lie parallel and where group loyalty is paramount. Under such conditions majority ethnic groups can dominate economically and politically via the allocation of benefits targeted on their members, which in turn can lead

party competition in post-communist society could be a function of a number of factors, including the extent of charismatic or clientelistic relationships inherited from the communist period and the institutional framework chosen in the transition period. However, in the context of Czechoslovakia the effects of each of these factors works in the same manner. Moreover, Kitschelt himself expects programmatic structuring of party competition to be present in both states. See H. Kitschelt, 'The Formation of Party Cleavages in Post-Communist Democracies. Theoretical Propositions'. Paper presented at the Workshop on Public Opinion and Party Formation in Post-Communist and Post-Authoritarian Democracies. Duke University, March 24–25 1995.

⁸ J. Gray, 'From post-communism to civil society: the re-emergence of history and the decline of the Western model', *Social Philosophy and Policy*, 10 (1993), 26–50; K. Jowitt, *New World Disorder: The Leninist Extinction* (London, University of California Press, 1992).

⁹ See Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe'.

¹⁰ See S. Whitefield and G. Evans, 'The Ideological Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe'. Paper presented at the American Political Science Association Annual Conference, New York, September 1994 (available from authors on request).

¹¹ See the discussion in A. Lijphart, *Democracy in Plural Societies: a Comparative Exploration* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 75–83.

to minority groups seeking non-democratic or separatist solutions to problems of representation, thus undermining the stability of ethnically divided states.

The goal of this paper is to investigate the validity of these competing political sociological representations of the ideological bases of politics through an empirical analysis of the structure of ideological cleavages in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1994. Because, as we show below, differences are evident between the two states in the character of both élite conflict and ideological cleavages at the mass level, these new republics provide a fascinating test case of the effects on emerging party systems of differences in the social and economic problems faced by states with, in other respects, very similar institutional arrangements, recent histories and pathways of transition from communism.¹² Thus, since the break from communism occurred within the federal Czechoslovak state, the mode of transition from authoritarian rule was the same; and, in the two successor states, institutional arrangements – parliamentary systems with strong prime ministers and presidents with some prerogative powers – and electoral rules and number of effective parties are close approximations.¹³ A whole range of possible institutional and path dependency explanations of divergent system structure are hence held constant, while differences in social and economic conditions are allowed to vary. We can therefore assess the extent to which the differing character of élite party competition and the factors structuring mass electoral choice are conditioned by the distinct objective challenges faced by the two states.

What are these challenges? First, the social and economic difficulties faced by the two states clearly differ. The Czech economy has been better placed to make a successful market transition than has the Slovak and as a result has achieved significantly better economic performance over the years since 1989.¹⁴ Not surprisingly, the relatively poor performance of the Slovak economy appears to have muted support for marketization.¹⁵ The calculus of costs and benefits associated with marketization thus provides a greater range of pro- and anti-economic positions in the former than the latter.

Secondly, and arguably more importantly, Czechs have not faced the difficulty of Slovaks in defining either borders or citizenship and do not have a large minority, equivalent to the Hungarians in Slovakia, with ties to a powerful neighbour. Slovakia is an ethnically heterogeneous state in which 10.76% of the population are ethnic Hungarians living in its southern region along the borders with Hungary.¹⁶ The ethnic interests of this minority have been pressed not only

¹² Elsewhere we have also demonstrated the existence of a similar political culture backed up by many years of shared – though of course not identical – historical experience: S. Whitefield and G. Evans, 'Explaining differences in political culture: the case of the Czech Republic and Slovakia', *British Journal of Political Science*, forthcoming.

¹³ See J. Batt, 'Czechoslovakia', in S. Whitefield, ed., *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe* (London, Macmillan, 1992); M. Bankowicz, 'Czechoslovakia – from Mazaryck to Havel', in S. Berglund and J. A. Dellenbrant, eds, *The New Democracies in Eastern Europe* (London, Edward Elgar, 1994 2nd ed.); G. Wightman, 'The Czech and Slovak Republics', in S. White, J. Batt, and P. G. Lewis, eds, *Developments in Eastern European Politics* (London, Macmillan, 1993).

¹⁴ See *OECD Short-term Statistics No. 2*, 1994; *Economic Survey of Europe in 1992–1993*, Economic Commission for Europe (United Nations, New York 1993); *EBRD Economic Review* (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, September 1993); *EBRD Economic Review* (London, European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, July 1993).

¹⁵ Whitefield and Evans, 'Explaining differences in political culture'.

¹⁶ *Statisticka ročenka Česka a Slovenske Federativni Republiky 1990* (Prague, 1990), p. 100. Cited in K. Henderson, *Czechoslovakia: the Failure of Consensus Politics*, University of Leicester

by the coalition of Hungarian parties, but by the keen interest of the Hungarian government between 1990 and 1994, for whom the issue of protection of the rights of Hungarians abroad constituted one of the central political issues.¹⁷ The presence of this sizeable minority population in Slovakia with an ethnic and potentially political tie to what is perceived by ethnic Slovaks to be a powerful neighbour has created a basis of national insecurity which is not found in the Czech lands.¹⁸ In addition, it is conservatively estimated that as many as 300,000 Gypsies are also located within Slovakia's borders, though in their case neither international nor strong domestic representation is available.

Despite the apparent distinctiveness of the social and economic factors impinging on system development in the two countries, neither the 'missing middle' approach which expects only very weakly developed ideological bases to partisanship, nor those which emphasize unidimensional structure (either ethnic divisions or liberalism versus authoritarianism) to cleavages are able to provide clear predictions concerning differences between them. In contrast, the arguments advanced in our previous writings predict quite explicitly that in countries such as the Czech Republic, characterized by relatively advanced marketization, high ethnic homogeneity and stable borders, attitudes towards the market are likely to be the most salient bases of partisanship. In Slovakia, however, where there exists a salient minority with ties to an interested neighbour as well as a significant Gypsy population, and where marketization is less developed, they predict greater salience of ethnic rights issues and a less clearly defined socio-economic dimension to political partisanship.¹⁹

Taking these arguments further, we can also consider the implications of the patterning of élite conflict for the stability of the two political systems. As we have also argued previously, where socio-economic cleavages predominate, the potential for compromise at both mass and élite levels is significantly greater than it is when ethnic allegiances are central to party support: ethnic divisions tend to be less negotiable, identities more fixed, and ethnic political conflicts less easily accountable in terms of instrumental orientations. An implication of this is that levels of political conflict and élite instability in Slovakia would be expected to be higher than in the Czech Republic.²⁰

In the following analysis these propositions are tested both by a review of the evidence on the pattern of élite ideological divisions in the two countries and through an assessment of mass political preferences and their links to party support. This latter data is taken from national probability surveys of the Czech

Discussion paper in Politics, 1993. The largest ethnic minority in the Czech Republic are Slovaks, who have generally been well-assimilated. See J. Pehe, 'Slovaks in the Czech Republic: a new minority', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 23 (1993), 59–62.

¹⁷ See A. Reisch, 'Hungarian-Slovak relations: a difficult first year', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 50 (1993), 16–23; and G. Evans and S. Whitefield, 'Social and ideological cleavage formation in post-communist Hungary', *Europe-Asia Studies*, 47 (1995), 1177–1204.

¹⁸ These insecurities are not to be treated as some atavistic residue: In Sharon Wolchik's words, 'as is the case in many situations in which ethnic issues have come to dominate political life, the ability of ethnic leaders to use such circumstances to their own advantage derived in part from the fact that there were important differences in the objectives and perspectives of the two groups'. S. Wolchik, 'The politics of ethnicity in post-communist Czechoslovakia', *East European Politics and Societies*, 8 (1994), 187.

¹⁹ See Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe', pp. 539–43.

²⁰ See Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe', pp. 543–47.

Republic and Slovakia conducted by the authors in collaboration with the Stredisko empirických vyzkumu (STEM) in 1994 (see Appendix I for details).

To review our findings, we demonstrate the existence of important differences in the mass ideological bases of politics in the Czech Republic and Slovakia – differences which mirror divisions between élites. The issue bases of partisanship in the Czech Republic are mainly concerned with economic questions, while in Slovakia these are of only secondary importance in structuring vote after the question of ethnic rights. In both republics there is also a relatively minor dimension of partisanship based on issues relating to social liberalism and attitudes towards Gypsies. Significantly, distributions of attitudes towards issues such as nationalism or ethnic intolerance, which might be disruptive of constitutional arrangements, do not differ widely between the two populations.²¹ The centrality of ethnic and national questions to politics in Slovakia is rather, we contend, the result of the challenges of state-building faced by the new Republic – concerning its borders and criteria for citizenship – and not because of a distinct Slovak political culture of ethnic intolerance or nationalism. The fact that politics in Slovakia in the aftermath of the split have, perforce, become centrally oriented around ethnic questions is likely to be the best explanation of the extent of élite and partisan conflict there by comparison with the Czech Republic, as party leaders in both ethnic groups appeal to interests which are in practice, if not principle, difficult to compromise or to process within governing coalitions.

The Ideological Bases of Elite Divisions in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

The break-up of Czechoslovakia on 31 December 1992 was not widely anticipated in the immediate aftermath of the ‘velvet revolution’. Although the 1990 elections had been fought on a federal basis, the two dominant parties which emerged in each republic – Civic Forum in the Czech Republic and Public Against Violence in Slovakia – were closely allied and received between them more than 46% of the vote.²² Given the peaceful character to mass popular protest against the old communist regime and the inter-war legacy of democratic institutions, the prospects for a stable relationship between the two parts of Czechoslovakia seemed good.²³

The ‘velvet divorce’, however civilized, was not easy to reconcile with this rosy post-1989 expectation. Because parties had essentially national rather than Czechoslovak mandates and bases of support, and because of the differences in social and economic contexts of the two parts of the federation discussed above, the encompassing movements which won power in the two republics quickly broke up and were replaced by successor parties appealing to distinct sorts of interests.²⁴ In the Czech Republic, the Civic Democratic Party under the leadership of Vaclav Klaus was the dominant party to emerge from Civic Forum and was committed to neo-liberal market reforms. In Slovakia, by contrast, the most powerful party to emerge from Public Against Violence was Vladimir Meciar’s Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and it aligned itself not

²¹ Whitefield and Evans, ‘Explaining differences in political culture’.

²² See C. Cook and J. Paxton, *European Political Facts 1918–90*, p. 134.

²³ For a discussion of this see J. Batt, ‘Czechoslovakia’, in S. Whitefield, ed., *The New Institutional Architecture of Eastern Europe* (London, Macmillan, 1993), pp. 35–55.

²⁴ Batt, ‘Czechoslovakia’, pp. 41–2.

only to greater Slovak independence but to a much more cautious programme of economic reform.²⁵ By the time the second election was fought in 1992, therefore, the Federal Assembly was split between two powerful and ideologically distinct nationally based parties. Rather than seeking a *modus vivendi*, the leadership of both parties took the path of separation – Klaus because economic reform was easier to pursue without having to deal with the greater difficulties which Slovakia was bound to experience, Meciar because he could not gain agreement on an acceptable constitutional relationship between the two parts of the country. As Gordon Wightman has argued, the split was ‘practically unavoidable given that the elections had produced majorities in the two republican parliaments for parties with divergent and irreconcilable programmes and a Federal Assembly where the only attainable consensus was an agreement to part company’.²⁶

Since the split, differences have become even more evident between the two countries in the manner in which government and party élites have framed political issues. In the first place it appears that parties in the Czech Republic have chosen to compete over mainly economic questions. The Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance – both off-shoots of Civic Forum – have stood on a pro-market position against left-wing opposition coming mainly from Czech Social Democracy and the Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia. The main issues of contention among these parties have been related to privatization (and associated corruption) and the general role of the state in economic and social life.²⁷ Nonetheless, other parties have appealed to a further set of issues: differences have emerged on a number of issues between church and state: the Christian and Democratic Union – Czechoslovak People’s Party has campaigned on more traditional Catholic social issues²⁸ and the Republican Party has raised nationalist and ethnic issues, especially anti-Germanism.²⁹

In Slovakia, by contrast, parties have presented a much more complex set of issues to the electorate. The national question was first put on the agenda by Slovak parties such as the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and the more extreme Slovak National Party.³⁰ Moreover, the latter party also defined itself in antagonism to the interests of neighbouring Hungary and to the Hungarians residing in Slovakia. This, in turn, cemented the position of the various ethnically Hungarian parties which operated electorally under a coalition.³¹

²⁵ S. Wolchik, ‘The repluralization of politics in Czechoslovakia’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 26 (1993), 412–31.

²⁶ G. Wightman, ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics’, in S. White, J. Batt and P. Lewis, eds, *Developments in East European Politics* (London, Macmillan, 1993), p. 52. For an account which combines cultural and circumstantial factors in explanation see J. Musil, ‘Czech and Slovak society’, *Government and Opposition*, 28 (1993), 479–95.

²⁷ J. Obrman, ‘The Czechoslovak elections: a guide to the parties’, *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 22 (1992), 1–16; G. Wightman, ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics’; D. Olson, ‘Dissolution of the state: political parties and the 1992 election in Czechoslovakia’, *Communist and Post-Communist Studies*, 26 (1993), 301–14.

²⁸ See S. Kettle, ‘Church-state standoff’, *Transition*, 1, No. 12 (1995), 20–5.

²⁹ Obrman, ‘The Czechoslovak elections: a guide to the parties’; Wightman, ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics’; Olson, ‘Dissolution of the state’.

³⁰ For a discussion of the range of Slovak parties see Z. Butorova and M. Butora, ‘Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia’s Road to Independence’, in G. Wightman, ed., *Party Formation in East-Central Europe* (London, Edward Elgar, 1995), pp. 114–6.

³¹ A. Reisch, ‘Hungarian ethnic parties prepare for Czechoslovak elections’, *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 18 (1992), 26–32.

These issues, however, did not push economic or social questions wholly out of political discussion; the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia was distinctly populist in its economic appeal, while the economic left was more conventionally represented by the communist-successor Party of the Democratic Left, which comprised the main party of the electoral alliance Common Choice Bloc. Finally, the Christian Democratic Movement, though non-denominational, stood on an amalgam of economically right, nationalist and socially conservative positions.³²

These events suggest that the pattern of issue positions adopted by parties in the two countries are consistent with the combination of economic, ethnic and nation-building influences on cleavage formation we have argued for both above and in previous papers. However, these élite characterizations in themselves tell us little about whether the issues adopted by élites reflect the electorates' orientations. Indeed, Sharon Wolchik has argued that, at least in 1992, the 'party system did not function in such a way as to translate citizens' preferences to political élites reliably'.³³ Clearly, we need to assess the extent to which the ideological cleavages evident among parties are also the ideological divisions between voters for those parties.

The Ideological Bases of Mass Partisanship in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

This section of the paper presents the empirical analysis of the ideological structuring of mass voting preferences in the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1994. For this purpose, attitudes towards issues pertaining to élite competition – concerning, for example, the preferred speed and nature of economic transition, the importance of 'traditional values', the independence of the nation, or the rights of ethnic minorities – have been operationalized using relevant questions asked in each of the surveys. To measure the effect of different issues in forming political cleavages as effectively as possible, we then constructed a number of multi-item scales from separate items in the questionnaire. These correspond to the dimensions identified above as comprising the main lines on which parties compete for support.

Economic liberalism is indexed by attitudes towards the free market and state economic intervention. These constitute the traditional left-right dimension of politics identified in many studies of issue cleavages in the West.³⁴ Social liberalism concerns the freedom of individuals from interference in the exercise of their rights and toleration of different life-styles and beliefs. Research in the West suggests that attitudes towards such issues tend to form a secondary dimension of political competition, and are closely related to religious

³² Butorova and Butora, 'Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia's Road to Independence'.

³³ Wolchik, 'The repluralization of politics in Czechoslovakia', p. 422.

³⁴ See I. Budge, and D. Farlie, *Explaining and Predicting Elections: Issue Effects and Party Strategies in Twenty-Three Democracies* (London, George, Allen and Unwin, 1983); A. Lijphart, *Democracies* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1984); O. Knutson, 'The impact of structural and ideological party cleavages in Western European democracies: a comparative empirical analysis', *British Journal of Political Science*, 18 (1988), 323–52; J. Huber, 'Values and partisanship in left-right orientations: measuring ideology', *European Journal of Political Research*, 17 (1989), 599–621; G. Evans, A. Heath and M. Lalljee, 'Measuring left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values in the British electorate', *British Journal of Sociology*, 47 (1996), 93–112.

cleavages.³⁵ Ethnic liberalism measures the extent to which ethnic minorities may expect equal treatment within the state. Given the importance of national issues at the élite level, we also constructed a scale of nationalism, using items concerning aspects of national pride. Attitudes towards the influence of Western institutions and capital are measured separately from those pertaining to nationalism *per se*. Although potentially allied to feelings of nationalism, the issue of Western involvement also taps into attitudes towards the free market and is therefore likely to be related to economic liberalism, and to form a component of a left-right dimension. Finally, given its likely salience – especially in Slovakia – a measure of attitudes towards Gypsies was also included in the analyses. Detailed information on these scales is given in Appendix II.

First we consider the structure of relations between the different issue dimensions in the two countries. Analysis of similar data comparing a number of other countries in Eastern Europe has shown that there can be quite distinct patterns of association among these dimensions, particularly as regards the strength of connection between economic and other forms of liberalism.³⁶ Any observed differences in these relationships may help to account for variations in the structure of partisan cleavages.

Table 1 shows the correlations between each issue dimension in both countries. It can be seen that in many ways they are rather alike. There are, however, three interesting differences – one concerning attitudes towards the West, and the others concerning ethnic liberalism.

Firstly, attitudes among Czechs towards Western involvement seem to relate more closely to economic liberalism ($r = 0.43$) than they do in Slovakia ($r = 0.31$). This should not surprise us as connections with the West, especially with Germany, have been more salient to politics in the more advanced EU-conscious Czech Republic than in Slovakia.³⁷ This salience is also indicated by the higher correlations between attitudes towards the West and left-right self-placement in the Czech Republic (0.36) than in Slovakia (0.21).³⁸

Secondly, in the Czech Republic, ethnic liberalism is correlated more strongly with attitudes towards Gypsies (0.33) than it is with nationalist sentiments (0.13), whereas in Slovakia the reverse is the case (0.19 and 0.27 respectively). This, and other analyses,³⁹ lead us to believe that for Czechs questions of minority rights tend to elicit thoughts about the Gypsy question – certainly, there is evidence for the political salience of this issue in Czech politics⁴⁰ – whereas for Slovaks it tends to tap into questions about Hungarians and even the national status of Slovakia itself. As we shall see below, this interpretation is consistent with indications of the relative political importance of ethnic liberalism in the two republics.

³⁵ See, for example, A. Heath, B. Taylor and G. Toka, 'Religion, morality and politics', in R. Jowell, L. Brook and L. Dowds, eds, *British Social Attitudes: Special International Report* (Aldershot, Dartmouth, 1993); and Knutson, 'The impact of structural and ideological party cleavages in Western European democracies'.

³⁶ See Whitefield and Evans, 'The Ideological Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe'.

³⁷ See J. Pehe, 'The choice between Europe and provincialism', *Transition*, 1, No. 12 (1993), 14–9.

³⁸ Left-right self-placement was measured on a 10-point scale: see G. Evans and S. Whitefield, 'Economic ideology and political success: communist-successor parties in the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary', *Party Politics*, 1 (1995), 565–78.

³⁹ Whitefield and Evans, 'Explaining differences in political culture'.

⁴⁰ See Z. Barany, 'Grim realities in eastern Europe', *Transition*, 1, No. 4 (1995), 3–8.

TABLE 1. Correlations Between Issue Dimensions in Each Country

		Slovakia					
		Economic liberalism	Social liberalism	Ethnic liberalism	Western involvement	Nationalism	Gypsies
Czech Rep.	Economic liberalism	–	0.34	0.12	0.31	0.16	0.14
	Social liberalism	0.33	–	0.13	0.16	0.05	0.14
	Ethnic liberalism	0.12	0.17	–	0.13	0.27	0.19
	Western involvement	0.43*	0.17	0.13	–	0.18	0.08
	Nationalism	0.15	0.02	0.13*	0.22	–	–0.07
	Gypsies	0.13	0.14	0.34*	0.06	0.01	–

All correlations at 0.05 or above are significant at $p < 0.01$.

Czech Republic N = 1485. Slovakia N = 1456.

*Significantly different from equivalent Slovak coefficient @ $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 2. Distribution of Intended Party Support as a Percentage of Those Expressing a Party Preference in Czech Survey (number of supporters in brackets) and Support in 1992 Czech National Council Elections

	Czech Survey	Czech Elections [#]
Civic Democratic Party (CDP)	45.0 (422)	29.7
Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA)	10.9 (102)	5.9
Czech Social Democracy (CSD)	13.0 (122)	6.5
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM)	10.3 (97)	14.1
Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (CDU)	4.7 (44)	6.3
Liberal Social Union (LSU) [†]	4.2 (39)	6.5
Republican Party (RP)	3.6 (34)	6.0
Others	8.3 (78)	25.0

*Percentage of 'don't knows' and 'won't votes' in total sample: 33.6%.

[#]Turnout: 85%.

[†]Parties competing in the 1992 elections as part of the LSU bloc are similarly aggregated in the 1994 survey.

It appears that in general the structure of attitudes in the two countries is rather similar, but with indications that ethnic liberalism has a somewhat different relationship to other issues. This gives some grounds for expecting a difference between the two republics in the structure of the links between issue positions and party choice. The next step is to examine the structure of partisanship itself. For this purpose respondents were asked for whom they would vote if there were an election in their country tomorrow. Table 2 shows the distribution of party supporters among those in the Czech Republic expressing a party preference when the survey was conducted in May 1994. This can be compared with the figures for the Czech elections conducted two years previously in 1992.

Clearly, there are significant differences in levels of party support at the two time-points. Some of these are probably the result of underlying changes in voter preference; other evidence does suggest that Czech Social Democracy has overtaken the Communist Party as the dominant party of the left;⁴¹ and the Civic Democratic Party had certainly consolidated its support in the early part of 1994.⁴² Nonetheless, it is probable that support for the Civic Democratic Party was over-estimated at the time of the surveys as a result of the large number of people indicating that they did not know for which party they would vote.

The relationship between partisanship and the ideological scales is examined first at the level of the structure of the party system. For this we employ discriminant analysis. This technique enables us to estimate the number of distinct dimensions that underlie the ideological divisions among the supporters of the different parties. It also estimates the multivariate effects of the ideology

⁴¹ J. Vermeersch, 'Social Democracy in the Czech Republic and Slovakia', in M. Waller, B. Coppieters and K. Deschouwer, eds, *Social Democracy in a Post-Communist Europe* (London, Cass, 1994), pp. 125–8.

⁴² J. Obrman, 'Czech opposition parties in disarray', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 16 (1993), 1–5.

scales on preference for different parties. When using discriminant analysis there is no need to order the parties or to simplify the data by dichotomizing responses.

Discriminant analysis estimates one or more linear combinations (functions) of the discriminating variables (in this case the ideological scales) which maximize the difference between the grouping variable (the parties); the maximum number of functions being the number of categories in the dependent variable, minus one (in this case, therefore, six).⁴³ If there is only one dimension of political cleavage, then the combination of ideological scales should form one significant discriminant function. If, however, there are cross-cutting cleavages which need to be taken into account to represent adequately the structure of the political system, then other functions will also be significant. The analysis should thus inform us of (i) how many ideological dimensions parties divide along – this is indicated by the number of functions; and (ii) which scales are most relevant for differentiating between parties.

Table 3 presents the results of the discriminant analysis for the Czech Republic. To interpret the findings in this Table keep in mind that the associations between the ideological scales and the dimensions in the discriminant analysis are given by the standardized function coefficients and the correlation coefficients shown in parentheses. The positions of party supporters on these dimensions are given by the mean scores (shown below the function coefficients). By examining both the function/correlation coefficients and the mean scores we can see which scales are most strongly related to support for which parties.

From Table 3 it can be seen that there are two distinct dimensions of partisanship in the Czech Republic. By far the strongest of these is comprised of attitudes towards economic liberalism and Western involvement. As we know from Table 1, questions about Western involvement in the Czech Republic are strongly related to economic attitudes. Similarly, the pattern of party competition at the élite level, in which the severest divisions appear to be related to positions on market reform, is mirrored in similar bases for partisanship among the mass of electors. Czech political divisions, to a noteworthy extent, are oriented around the economy; other issues, which could have been of salience to an electorate which has just emerged from an authoritarian regime into a new, and presumably fragile state, do not appear to play an important role in structuring partisanship.

At the same time, our characterization of élite conflict indicated that at least two parties based their appeal on other themes: the Christian Democratic Union highlighted traditional social values, and the Republican Party stood on ethnic and national matters. These issues – along with attitudes towards Gypsies – do appear to constitute the main aspects of a weaker but still significant second dimension. Notably, however, the direction of the relationship among these issues is not straightforward; social illiberalism is not associated with ethnic illiberalism or intolerance towards Gypsies, as might have been expected, but loads in the reverse direction. Respondents whose party preference is related to opposition to ethnic and Gypsy rights, also display a marked opposition to traditional social values. In addition to parties of the economic right, therefore, there are two other opposed 'right-wing' positions in

⁴³ See W. R. Klecka, *Discriminant Analysis* (Beverly Hills CA, Sage, 1980).

TABLE 3. The Ideological Bases of Party Competition in the Czech Republic
(Discriminant analysis with rotated functions)

Ideological scales	Standardized function coefficients (correlations)	
	Dimension 1	Dimension 2**
Economic liberalism	0.76 (0.85)	0.00 (0.08)
Social liberalism	-0.09 (0.22)	0.83 (0.64)
Ethnic liberalism	-0.12 (-0.03)	-0.43 (-0.49)
Western involvement	0.48 (0.71)	-0.29 (-0.23)
Nationalism	0.06 (0.26)	-0.05 (-0.15)
Gypsies	-0.15 (-0.04)	-0.42 (-0.23)
Party Supporters	Means	
Civic Democratic Party (CDP)	0.52	-0.07
Civic Democratic Alliance (CDA)	0.25	0.05
Czech Social Democracy (CSSD)	-0.63	0.19
Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (CPBM)	-1.39	0.09
Christian and Democratic Union-Czechoslovak People's Party (CDU-CPP)	-0.13	-0.69
Liberal Social Union (LSU)	-0.09	0.03
Republican Party (RP)	-0.64	0.68
% of variance explained	87.1	8.6
Canonical correlation	0.55**	0.20**

Proportion of cases correctly classified 52.9%.

**significant at $p < 0.001$.

N = 841.

Czech politics, albeit of relatively minor importance; social conservatives who are ethnically tolerant Christian Democratic Union supporters and their converse (Republican Party supporters).

Table 3 also provides some evidence as to the relative positions of the various parties in relation to these ideological cleavages. Again, the scores for each party tend to confirm the élite picture. On the first, mainly economic, dimension the Communist Party stands out as being particularly left wing with the Civic Democratic Party of Klaus at the other extreme. Between these, to the left and right stand the Civic Democratic Alliance and the Social Democrats. The Liberal Social Union, a purely electoral coalition of parties, including the Greens, the Agricultural Party and the Czech Socialist Party, are located in a neutral position, on this and the second dimension – which is not surprising given the level of ideological heterogeneity within the alliance.⁴⁴ As expected, the Christian Democrats and the Republican Party are most distinct from the other parties and each other on the second dimension; what is of interest is the

⁴⁴ See T. Kostecky, 'Changing party allegiances in a changing party system: the 1990 and 1992 parliamentary elections in the Czech Republic', in Wightman, *Party Formation in East-Central Europe*, p. 81.

economic interventionism and anti-Western attitudes of the Republicans on the first dimension.

Although useful for describing the overall ideological structure of voters' party choices and the general character of the party system, discriminant analysis is less informative for showing precise differences in the ideological positions of party supporters. It does not, for example, present the significance of differences between parties on particular issues. Moreover, as we have seen, the two functions identified in the analysis are comprised of multiple issues so that similar party locations overall may disguise important differences on particular issues. More leverage on the bases of differences between the supporters of particular parties can be obtained by estimating models which predict support for one party or another in a range of two-party contrasts. As the dependent variables are dichotomous, the impact of the ideological scales in explaining differences between particular pairs of parties is estimated using a series of logistic regressions. Logistic regression is similar to an ordinary least squares regression, in that it regresses a dependent variable onto a multivariate set of predictors and estimates their net effects. Unlike OLS regression, however, logistic regression calculates the (log) odds of being in one response category rather than another. It is therefore more suitable for dichotomous dependent variables than is OLS regression.⁴⁵

Table 4 presents the results of these logistic regressions and tends to confirm the picture of elite party competition given above and the evidence from the discriminant analysis. There are no significant ideological differences between the supporters of the Civic Democratic Party and the Civic Democratic Alliance, which is consistent with the argument that their different fortunes are accounted for by organizational factors.⁴⁶ Interestingly, differences between supporters of the Civic Democratic Party and both Czech Social Democracy and the Communist Party are confined to those issues which were of greatest importance on the first dimension – economic liberalism and attitudes towards Western involvement. Supporters of the Civic Democratic Party also emerge as significantly more liberal on economic policy than the Christian Democratic Union or the Republic Party, though they are notably more socially liberal than the former and illiberal than the latter. Again, however, supporters of the Republican Party are clearly anti-West and ethnically illiberal by comparison with those of the dominant party.

Other comparisons are as expected: the Communists are clearly more left-wing than the Social Democrats, as well as more nationalist; otherwise, there is little to distinguish them. Differences between Communists and Republicans are not evident on economic issues; the latter, however, are markedly more ethnically illiberal and anti-Gypsy. Finally, the comparison of the Republicans and the Christian Democratic Union confirms the picture presented in the discriminant analysis.

How do these issue bases of partisanship compare with those in Slovakia? Elite party competition in Slovakia has taken on a different emphasis, in which national and ethnic questions appeared more central than either economic or

⁴⁵ See J. Aldrich and F. Nelson, *Linear, Probability, Logit and Probit Models* (Beverly Hills CA, Sage, 1984).

⁴⁶ See P. Lewis, B. Lomax and G. Wightman, 'The Emergence of Multi-Party Systems in East-Central Europe: A Comparative Analysis', in G. Pridham and T. Vanhanen, eds, *Democratization in Eastern Europe* (London, Routledge, 1994), p. 170.

TABLE 4. Party Comparisons Regressed onto Issue Dimensions in the Czech Republic (logistic regressions)

	Logistic parameter estimates							
	CDP CDA	CDP CSD	CDP CPBM	CDP CDU	CDP RP	CSD CPBM	CPBM RP	CDU RP
Economic liberalism	-0.35 (0.23)	-1.30 (0.23)**	-2.78 (0.38)**	-0.95 (0.35)**	-1.99 (0.44)**	-1.08 (0.29)**	0.68 (0.49)	-0.56 (0.58)
Social liberalism	0.27 (0.26)	0.62 (0.27)*	0.65 (0.36)	-1.07 (0.38)**	1.54 (0.50)**	-0.28 (0.33)	1.19 (0.56)**	2.73 (0.81)**
Ethnic liberalism	-0.07 (0.21)	0.09 (0.20)	0.47 (0.29)	0.24 (0.30)	-0.66 (0.34)*	0.53 (0.26)*	-1.50 (0.44)**	-0.98 (0.52)
West	-0.19 (0.13)	-0.73 (0.13)**	-0.91 (0.19)**	-0.20 (0.18)	-0.74 (0.23)**	-0.15 (0.18)	0.42 (0.26)	-0.72 (0.32)*
Nationalism	-0.09 (0.15)	0.02 (0.16)	-0.25 (0.21)	0.29 (0.23)	0.34 (0.28)	-0.38 (0.20)	0.76 (0.31)*	-0.07 (0.43)
Gypsies	-0.05 (0.14)	0.05 (0.13)	0.30 (0.19)	0.35 (0.19)	-0.30 (0.31)	0.23 (0.17)	-0.73 (0.34)*	-0.74 (0.41)
Initial -2 Log Likelihood	499.12	571	482.42	289.38	240.37	292.99	147.57	106.85
Model chi-square df	7.99	111.52**	213.95**	33.94**	64.39**	32.89**	36.49**	34.41**
N	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	510	533	505	456	446	214	127	78

*significant at $p < 0.05$.

**significant at $p < 0.01$.

TABLE 5. Distribution of Intended Party Support as Percentage of those Expressing a Party Preference in Slovak Survey (number of supporters in brackets) and Party Support in 1994 Slovak Elections

	Slovak survey*	Slovak elections#
Christian Democratic Movement (CDM)	12.5 (109)	10.1
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (MDS)	35.5 (310)	35.0
Slovak National party (SNP)	6.3 (55)	5.4
Common Choice Bloc (CCB) – includes Party of Democratic Left, Greens, Social Democratic Party	23.6 (207)	10.4
Association of Workers	–	7.3
Hungarian Coalition (HC)	9.5 (83)	10.2
Democratic Union	–	8.6
Others	12.6 (110)	13.1

*Percentage of 'don't knows' and 'won't votes' in total sample: 38.9%.

#Turnout in election: 75.7%.

social divisions. To investigate whether this characterization is appropriate to the mass bases of partisanship we follow the same analytic procedure as with the Czech Republic.

Elections to the Slovak parliament were held in September-October of 1994 and, as Table 5 shows, the distribution of actual support relates quite closely to that which emerged from the survey of Slovaks in the early Spring of that year. Eventual support for all parties is estimated within 2.5%, with the exception of the Common Choice Bloc, whose main partner was the Party of the Democratic Left, which is over-represented in the survey compared with its electoral standing. Some of this over-estimate is likely to be accounted for by a late swing away the Common Choice Bloc before the election. Also, at the time the sample was taken, the Association of Workers of Slovakia had not split from the left to stand on a separate basis, taking some of those who supported the Party of the Democratic Left in the survey with them. Nor had the Democratic Union formed from the Alliance of Slovak Democrats, and defectors from the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia and Slovak National Party but its support in the election appears to have been based on the pro-market, secular and occasionally chauvinistic appeal of its constituent elements.⁴⁷ The data may therefore be considered as a reasonably exact representation of Slovak opinion at the time of the election. Moreover, considering the ideological appeal of the two parties which emerged later in 1994, the cleavage structure identified below is very unlikely to have been altered by their inclusion in the analysis.

As with the Czech data, discriminant analysis is used to estimate the number and character of issue dimensions structuring party preferences, and the relative positions of the main parties on these dimensions. The results of this analysis are shown in Table 6. Important differences between the two countries are immediately evident.

⁴⁷ For a discussion see K. Williams, 'The Slovak Elections of 1994', Paper presented at the London School of Economics, 1994.

TABLE 6. The Ideological Bases of Party Competition in Slovakia (Discriminant analysis with rotated functions)

Ideological scales	Standardized coefficients (correlations)		
	Dimension 1**	Dimension 2**	Dimension 3*
Ethnic liberalism	0.97 (0.97)	-0.03 (0.14)	-0.02 (0.12)
Nationalism	0.18 (0.33)	0.13 (0.31)	-0.12 (-0.21)
Economic liberalism	-0.14 (-0.04)	0.70 (0.81)	0.01 (0.26)
Western involvement	-0.10 (0.02)	0.55 (0.74)	-0.16 (-0.07)
Gypsies	-0.03 (0.06)	0.06 (0.14)	0.64 (0.73)
Social liberalism	-0.05 (0.04)	-0.21 (0.09)	0.68 (0.72)
Party supporters		Group means	
Christian Democratic Movement	0.08	0.80	0.24
Movement for a Democratic Slovakia	-0.46	-0.08	-0.19
Slovak National Party	-0.71	0.03	0.34
Common Choice	-0.07	-0.39	0.04
Hungarian Coalition	2.22	0.18	0.09
% of variance explained	81.1**	16**	2.7*
Canonical correlations	0.64	0.35	0.15

Proportion of cases correctly classified 51.41%.

*significant at $p < 0.05$.

**significant at $p < 0.001$.

N = 743.

The strongest dimension to partisanship in Slovakia concerns the issue of ethnic rights. These attitudes stand more or less alone (the nationalism scale also loads rather weakly onto this dimension) as the best predictor of partisanship. As Table 6 shows, the poles on this dimension are taken up by supporters of the Hungarian Coalition in defence of ethnic rights and by the supporters of the Slovak National Party, for whom the question of ethnicity was central after independence had been won. Supporters of the ruling Movement for a Democratic Slovakia also load in an ethnically illiberal direction on this dimension.

The second significant ideological cleavage shaping Slovak politics is identical to the main cleavage in the Czech Republic. This dimension concerns pro- and anti-market distributional issues and attitudes towards Western economic involvement. As would be expected, supporters of the Christian Democratic Movement emerge as most strongly free-market against those of the Common Choice Bloc. More surprisingly, however, supporters of the supposedly populist Movement for a Democratic Slovakia do not appear to have a distinct position on this cleavage.

Finally, a third significant ideological basis for vote is also evident. Social liberalism and attitudes towards Gypsies constitute a further aspect of partisanship in which, once again, the Slovak National Party is the most distinctive.⁴⁸

⁴⁸ A discussion of the politicization of the issue of Gypsies in Slovak politics is given in S. Fisher, 'Romanies in Slovakia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 42 (1993), 54-9.

As with the Czech analysis, precise differences between parties can best be gauged using logistic regression. Table 7 presents the results of logistic regression of selected party pairs in which the ideological scales are used as predictors of differences in the character of support. Again, the analysis tends to confirm the picture which has already emerged. The Christian Democrats are clearly the most liberal party on the economy – significantly more so than Movement for a Democratic Slovakia, Common Choice Bloc, and the Hungarian Coalition. Support for the Common Choice Bloc, for its part, is more left-wing on the economy and anti-West than Movement for a Democratic Slovakia but more ethnically liberal and less anti-Gypsy. By comparison with the Hungarian Coalition, Common Choice Bloc support is not more left-wing, and though it has been the one non-Hungarian party which has made any inroads into the Hungarian electorate, its supporters do remain less ethnically liberal and more nationalist. Indeed, wherever supporters of the Hungarian Coalition are compared with those of the other parties, ethnic liberalism and nationalism stand out as significant differences. Interestingly, supporters of the Slovak National Party and the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia do not differ on most ideological matters: only with respect to attitudes towards Gypsies does Slovak National Party support appear more illiberal and nowhere, contrary to some expectations, do they appear more left-wing.⁴⁹

Slovak politics is clearly more ideologically fractured than Czech politics, and is oriented in the first instance around a very different issue. While economic liberalism matters in both places, it is of only secondary importance to ethnicity in Slovakia where membership in the national community, and the rights and benefits which may be associated with it, have the clearest association with electoral choices. Our theoretical expectations, therefore, both with respect to the existence of ideological bases to party support and to the issues which are likely to be central to it in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, appear to have been confirmed.

Conclusion: The Issue Bases of Politics and the Democratic Transition in the Czech Republic and Slovakia

Understanding the issue bases of partisanship is important because of what they tell us about the nature of mass ideological interests and partisan identities and the resulting parameters of political competition among élites for votes. Moreover, the shape and content of issues underlying partisanship may have a significant influence on the possibilities for arriving at a political consensus on the ‘rules of the game’ necessary to sustain democracies and on the form of institutional arrangements that may be required to encompass social divisions. In the context of post-communist societies, where democracy is newly established, the character of the issue bases to politics at the mass level is likely to be a central factor influencing the direction of democratic development.

In this respect, a variety of arguments have been put forward with regard to the nature of ideological divisions in contemporary Eastern Europe. A number of these have focused on the importance of institutional or path dependent factors in shaping the issue bases of partisanship. We do not wish to discount these, though we would emphasize that our choice of the case of the Czech

⁴⁹ Wolchik, ‘The repluralization of politics in Czechoslovakia’.

TABLE 7. Party Comparisons Regressed onto Issue Dimensions in Slovakia (logistic regressions)

	Logistic parameter estimates									
	CDM MDS	CDM SNP	CDM Choice	CDM HC	MDS SNP	MDS Choice	MDS HC	SNP Choice	SNP HC	Choice HC
Economic liberalism	-0.82 (0.25)**	-0.71 (0.41)	-1.44 (0.30)**	-0.74 (0.45)	0.35 (0.30)	-0.52 (0.19)**	-0.17 (0.50)	-0.87 (0.35)*	0.79 (0.72)	0.83 (0.41)*
Social liberalism	-0.15 (0.28)	0.76 (0.43)	0.57 (0.30)	0.02 (0.55)	0.62 (0.34)	0.46 (0.21)*	0.42 (0.63)	-0.18 (0.36)	-1.84 (1.03)	-0.22 (0.44)
Ethnic liberalism	-0.93 (0.27)**	-1.04 (0.36)**	-0.02 (0.25)	3.26 (0.50)**	-0.60 (0.33)	0.75 (0.19)**	5.22 (0.70)**	1.14 (0.33)**	5.15 (1.12)**	2.87 (0.37)**
West	-0.39 (0.14)**	-0.22 (0.22)	-0.61 (0.16)**	-0.83 (0.28)**	0.02 (0.16)	-0.21 (0.10)*	0.13 (0.29)	-0.21 (0.18)	-0.52 (0.48)	0.41 (0.24)
Nationalism	-0.25 (0.16)	-0.47 (0.28)	-0.16 (0.19)	0.73 (0.31)*	-0.11 (0.19)	-0.00 (0.12)	0.94 (0.35)**	0.20 (0.22)	0.57 (0.50)	0.50 (0.27)
Gypsies	-0.29 (0.16)	0.04 (0.22)	-0.23 (0.17)	-0.37 (0.30)	0.50 (0.19)**	0.12 (0.14)	0.37 (0.33)	-0.38 (0.23)	-0.38 (0.62)	0.28 (0.28)
Initial -2 Log likelihood	470.43	202.41	390.56	257.55	300.86	670.72	400.68	257.34	180.87	336.53
Model chi-squ. df	84.99**	33.62**	82.46**	133.65**	17.32**	35.27**	293.49**	27.87**	132.88**	176.13**
N	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6	6
	413	159	301	188	360	502	389	248	135	277

* significant at $p < 0.05$.

** significant at $p < 0.01$.

Republic and Slovakia allows us to hold such factors constant. Differences that we do observe between these two societies, therefore, can be strongly inferred to result from sociological factors. Proponents of such sociological explanations of political system development in Eastern Europe can be divided into those who have argued that the stringencies of communist rule make it unlikely that any ideological bases to partisanship will be present, at least until civil society has been reconstituted, and those who have claimed that ideological divisions are likely to be uni-dimensional in character. Our own theoretical expectations are quite different from these; we expected to find ideological divisions of a cross-cutting character resulting from the nature of the contemporary challenges faced by the states in question (though these could, of course, have long historical roots, as in ethnic diversity, or religious attachments).

In general terms, our theoretical expectations have been met against those of other commentators. At both mass and élite level we have found evidence of the importance of social and economic factors in determining the nature of issue bases in emerging post-communist democracies. Despite years of common historical experience and governance, a shared path of transition from communism, and continuing similarities in their political institutions, patterns of political division in the Czech Republic and Slovakia differ systematically: in the former, the transition to the market emerges as a central component of the ideological structuring of party divisions, whereas in the latter, ethnic questions are most closely related to party divisions and economic issues have only a secondary impact. The strength of the ethnic rights cleavage in Slovakia is, it should be noted, consistent with two conditions identified in our earlier writings:⁵⁰ first, the levels of ethnic heterogeneity in a country are likely to have a major impact on the issues influencing political affiliation; secondly, ethnic heterogeneity may have an even greater impact in cases where new states are having to define their borders and membership. Divisions over traditional values and social liberalism, related closely to religiosity, also have an impact in both of these historically Catholic communities – as they do in neighbouring Catholic Hungary.⁵¹ Propositions derived from the writings of Kitschelt and others concerning the generalized uni-dimensional ideological structure of party competition in Central Europe are thus not supported, at least in the Czech Republic and Slovakia; neither are the prognoses of those who see a strong civil society as a precondition for structured political interests.

A further observation we would like to draw to the reader's attention is that the existence of distinct issue bases to politics in the two countries does not appear to derive from distinct, pre-existing political cultures.⁵² Despite the political salience of ethnic issues, Slovaks do not express particularily illiberal or nationalist sentiments, and reactions to marketization appear to reflect differential experience of market success rather than any inherent difference in orientation to the economy. The distinct issue bases of politics in the two states appears likely to have been a direct consequence of the velvet divorce itself and the differential challenges that then faced the two successor states. This ensured that the new Slovak Republic would have to grapple alone with the vexed

⁵⁰ Evans and Whitefield, 'Identifying the bases of party competition in eastern Europe'.

⁵¹ Evans and Whitefield, 'Social and ideological cleavage formation in post-communist Hungary'.

⁵² Whitefield and Evans, 'Explaining differences in political culture'.

questions of citizenship and the relationship of its largest and most vocal minority to the Hungarian state on its borders.⁵³

The distinct shape of the issue bases to politics in the two countries in turn addresses a further question vital to democratic transitions. Given that the Czech Republic and Slovakia approximate a sort of laboratory test in which a number of key factors are held constant, why has Slovak politics at the élite level proved to be far more turbulent – as is evident from the difficulties in government coalition building, the fractiousness of parties, divisions between governing institutions, and the intensity of political conflict – than those in the Czech Republic?⁵⁴ A definitive answer to this conundrum clearly requires much more comparative analysis. However, our findings would indicate that the distinct nature of *issue cleavages* in the two states may provide part of the solution. Although issue cleavages formed around attitudes towards economic liberalism and Western involvement are no guarantee of a stable ideological framework for élite conflict – as an analysis of Poland, where mass politics are structured around very similar cleavages to those found in the Czech Republic, would show⁵⁵ – they are liable to prove less intractable than those formed around other sorts of interests and identities. However, where the ideological basis of politics is centred on ethnicity, as it is in Slovakia, the difficulties in stabilizing a new democratic regime may be particularly arduous. Ethnicity involves identity questions on which it may be extremely difficult to find a compromise, at least by comparison with those concerned with economic distribution.⁵⁶ Moreover, ethnicity is an emotive issue which may well bring forth the demagogue in politicians such as Meciar. Finally, the complexities of finding an *institutional* solution to the problem of incorporating ethnic interests are more difficult to overcome. As a result, politics at the élite level may take on a more conflictual and potentially authoritarian character.⁵⁷

Consideration of these outcomes must remain speculative, of course, as the prospects for stable democracy in Slovakia are not affected solely by the problems identified in our analysis: social factors may provide conditions which are more or less conducive to democratic stability, but they do not determine it. Institutional arrangements to cope with divided societies have worked in some countries,⁵⁸ and the élite difficulties found in Czechoslovakia need not apply to Slovakia itself. As we noted, the electorate in Slovakia do not appear to be particularly ethnically illiberal and there is even some evidence suggesting that the Slovak parties which have stood on more extreme ethnic and nationalist

⁵³ Wolchik may be wrong, therefore, when she concludes that the difficulties of transition in Slovakia have created a 'fertile ground for the growth of ethnic tensions and extreme nationalism'. Slovak politics may be oriented on ethnic issues but this does not imply particularly illiberal attitudes on ethnic questions. Wolchik, 'The politics of ethnicity in post-communist Czechoslovakia', p. 172.

⁵⁴ See S. Fisher and S. Hrib, 'Political crisis in Slovakia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 10 (1994) 20–6; J. Pehe, 'Czech government coalition: striving for stability', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 6 (1994) 15–21.

⁵⁵ Whitefield and Evans, 'The Ideological Bases of Party Competition in Eastern Europe'.

⁵⁶ See, for example, R. A. Dahl, *Dilemmas of Pluralist Democracy: Autonomy vs. Control* (New Haven and London, Yale University Press, 1982), pp. 56–67. D. L. Horowitz, *Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1985).

⁵⁷ For a discussion of this see Butorova and Butora, 'Political Parties, Value Orientations and Slovakia's Road to Independence'.

⁵⁸ A. Lijphart, *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands* (Berkeley, University of California Press, 1975, 2nd ed., rev.); Lijphart, *Democracies*.

policies are in the process of being marginalized.⁵⁹ The degree to which institutional arrangements can effectively regulate potentially divisive social factors thus remains to be seen.

Appendix I: the Surveys

The surveys were national probability samples of the adult populations of the Czech Republic and Slovakia aged 18 and over. The majority of these were drawn from the lists of voters in the 1992 elections (access to current lists was not allowed under Czech and Slovak law), with minor augmentation using random route procedures, and a small top up sample for urban areas where the rate of non-contact due to movement was especially high. The surveys were directed by Lubos Rezler and Jan Hartl of the *Stredisko empirickych vyzkumu* (STEM), from its offices in Prague and Bratislava.

TABLE A1. The Surveys

Czech Republic Spring 1994	Adult pop (18+)	1. 8 regions	Names issued: 2104
	List of voters from 1992 in sampled localities	2. 182 sampling points (localities) from 13410 3. 2104 addresses, of which: 1681 random list sampling (electoral register): 423 random route + 111 quota	Non-contact: 404 Refused: 291 Achieved: 1409 + 111 Response rate:* 0.67
Slovakia Spring 1994	Adult pop (18+)	1. 4 regions	Names issued: 2014
	List of voters from 1992 in sampled localities	2. 215 sampling points (localities) from 4191 3. 2014 address of which: 1100 first wave; 914 second wave. Random list sampling (electoral register) +68 quota	Non-contact: 338 Refused: 233 Achieved: 1443 + 68 Response rate: 0.75

Appendix II: the Attitude Scales

Each of the scales was constructed using Likert style items with 5-point response formats. Question wording was identical in the two countries (except, of course, where the name of the country was referred to). Selection of items for the scales was done partly on *a priori* grounds and partly through an item analysis. Thus in some cases items which reduced overall reliability (as measured by internal consistency estimated using Cronbach's alpha) were removed from the scale. This was not done, however, with some items which helped preserve the balance of the scales with regard to direction of question wording. These were retained even when their presence reduced the internal consistency of the scales because the preservation of balance helps to limit the likelihood of acquiescence effects,

⁵⁹ S. Fisher, 'The politics of intolerance: Slovakia', *RFE/RL Research Report*, No. 16 (1994) 68-71.

and thus has beneficial consequences for validity.⁶⁰ The consequences of choosing one or the other approach for the strengths of the associations between the scales and other variables are minor.⁶¹

Economic liberalism is measured with a ten-item Likert scale. Cronbach's alpha is 0.77 in the Czech Republic and 0.71 in Slovakia. The scale includes four double-sided items:

Which one of these two statements comes closest to your own views (definitely the first, the first rather than the second, in between, definitely the second, the second rather than the first)...

The government should see to it that every person has a job and a good standard of living.

or

The government should just let each person get ahead on their own.

The government should not concern itself with how equal people's incomes are.

or

The government should try to make differences between incomes as small as possible.

The government should take all major industries into state ownership.

or

The government should place all major industries in private ownership.

The government should just leave it up to individual companies to decide their wages, prices and profits.

or

The government should control wages, prices and profits.

Plus six 5-point (strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree, strongly disagree, scales:

Please choose one of the phrases from this card to tell me whether and to what degree you agree with each statement. In the Czech Republic/Slovakia...

Private enterprise is the best way to solve the country's economic problems.

Major public services and industries ought to be in state ownership.

Large differences in income are necessary for prosperity.

⁶⁰ For a general review see 'The Acquiescence Quagmire', in H. Schuman and S. Presser, *Questions and Answers in Attitude Surveys: Experiments on Question Form, Wording and Context* (New York, Academic, 1981). For similar treatments of acquiescence effects in comparable data to that presented here, see A. Heath, G. Evans and J. Martin, 'The measurement of core beliefs and values: the development of balanced socialist/laissez-faire and libertarian/authoritarian scales', *British Journal of Political Science*, 24 (1994), 115–32.

⁶¹ See G. Evans and A. Heath, 'The measurement of left-right and libertarian-authoritarian values: comparing balanced and unbalanced scales', *Quality and Quantity*, 29 (1995), 191–206.

Allowing business to make good profits is the best way to improve everyone's standard of living.

It is the responsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income between people with high incomes and those with low incomes.

The government should provide everyone with a guaranteed basic income.

The *social liberalism* scale has seven 5-point agree/disagree items. Cronbach's alpha is 0.46 in the Czech Republic and 0.42 in Slovakia.

In the Czech Republic/Slovakia . . .

People should be allowed to organize public meetings to protest against the government.

Homosexual relationships are always wrong.

People in this country should be more tolerant of those who lead unconventional lives.

Young people today don't have enough respect for traditional values.

Censorship of films and magazines is necessary to uphold moral standards.

What this country needs to resolve its economic problems is government with a strong hand.

Czech/Slovak people should be free to emigrate even if the country needs their skills.

Ethnic rights attitudes are measured using four agree/disagree items. Cronbach's alpha for the four item scale is 0.47. In Slovakia it is 0.55. With the item worded in an illiberal direction removed alpha is increased slightly.

Minority ethnic groups in the Czech Republic/Slovakia should have far more rights than they do now.

Everyone who lives in the Czech Republic/Slovakia should have the right to become a citizen regardless of their ethnic origins.

The ethnic group a person belongs to should not influence the benefits they can get from the state.

All minority ethnic groups in this country should have to be taught in Czech/Slovak.

Anti-gypsy attitudes were measured using a single agree-disagree item:

There are too many Gypsies in the Czech Republic/Slovakia.

Nationalism was measured using two items. The correlation between these items is 0.21 in the Czech Republic and 0.26 in Slovakia.

We have a lot to learn from other countries in running Czech/Slovak affairs.

The Czech Republic/Slovakia should co-operate with other countries even if it means giving up some independence.

Pro- and anti-Western attitudes were measured using just two double-sided items, responses to which correlated 0.42 in the Czech Republic and 0.26 in Slovakia. Which one of these two statements comes closest to your own views . . .

Western institutions have been helpful and supportive of our country.

or

Western institutions have been interfering in our affairs and using our difficulties for their own advantage.

Foreign ownership of enterprises is acceptable if it improves the state of our economy.

or

It is better that we should continue to own our enterprises even if it means more hardship in the future.

NB: All of the scales are scored so that high scores indicate liberal positions. Scores on items which are inconsistent with this direction have been reversed.

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